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Abstract: Establishing open and undistorted competition within the internal market is a 
primary goal of the EU legal framework.  Price controls, by contrast, are among the 
clearest derogations from this overarching objective. Yet much price regulation 
continues to occur within the internal market, the legal treatment of which is recognised 
to raise exceptional issues in the context of both positive and negative integration.  This 
article explores the approaches within the EU legal framework to price regulation, 
broadly construed.  Following a theoretical inquiry of the institutional and ideological 
challenges posed, a range of regulatory circumstances is considered: from competition 
enforcement, to the free movement rules, to examples of direct regulation through EU 
law.  A tentative explanation for the distinctive treatment of price regulation is then 
advanced, premised upon the axiomatic role of the price formative mechanism in 
motivating the entrepreneurial impulses which underpin the internal market.  The aim is 
to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the challenges facing pursuit of ‘open 







[A] measure which requires a product or service to be offered on the market at a determined 
price…is by its very nature contrary to the objective of achieving an open and competitive 
market.1  
 
Establishing open and undistorted competition within the internal market is a primary goal of the European 
Union (EU) legal framework.2  In developing a ‘highly competitive social market economy,’3 interventions 
focus on prevention and proscription of anticompetitive practices by undertakings and Member States, 
alongside harmonised efforts at sector liberalisation.  Price controls, acknowledged as ‘one of the most intrusive 
forms of intervention in the market,’4 are among the most ‘extreme’5 derogations from this objective.  Price is one 
                                                     
* Assistant Professor, Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science. Grateful thanks to Floris de 
Witte, Pablo Ibáñez Colomo and participants in the fourth Next Generation of Antitrust Scholars Conference, NYU School 
of Law, January 2016, for comments on earlier versions of this work.   
 
1 C-121/15 ANODE EU:C:2016:637, para.30. 
2 Alongside the substantive competition rules in Articles 101-109 TFEU, see references to avoiding distortions of 
competition in Articles 32(c), 113, 116 and 348 TFEU, and ‘the principle of an open market economy with free competition’ 
in Articles 119, 120 and 127 TFEU. 
3 Article 3(3), TEU. 
4 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in C-58/08 Vodafone EU:C:2009:596, para.38. 
5 Opinion in Vodafone, para.42. 
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of, if not the, foremost dimensions of competition:6 indeed, ‘competition is, by its very essence, determined by price’.7  
Yet, both because the competitive process is often imperfect, and because social considerations may override 
competitive ones within the wider context of the internal market, price regulation is not irreconcilable, a 
priori, with the goals and strictures of EU law.  This article considers the treatment of price regulation in this 
context—located at the intersection of competition policy, social policy, and market integration—and 
explores the implications of the balance that is struck within the EU’s so-called ‘economic constitution’.8  
EU law interacts with and regulates price-setting on three distinct levels.9   First, via the competition 
rules, it constrains the ability of individual undertakings to set prices in certain instances.  Examples range from 
a blanket proscription of price-fixing cartels, to more exceptional condemnation of excessive pricing by 
dominant firms.  Second, EU law limits the ability of Member States to regulate prices, particularly under the 
free movement rules.  It is here that the constituent elements of the ‘social market’ economy are most 
vulnerable to discordance. 10  An example is Scotch Whisky, where national efforts to impose minimum retail 
pricing for alcohol, motivated by public health concerns about hazardous drinking, conflicted with Article 34 
TFEU insofar as the domestic regulation hindered access to the national market.11  Third, and most 
unusually, there is scope for direct implementation of price controls as a matter of EU law.  A prominent 
example is the Roaming Regulation, which capped and progressively reduced prices for mobile phone 
customers who use their devices abroad.12  
The dilemma of price regulation within the EU is located at the confluence of two distinct yet related 
tensions: a regulatory friction and a sovereignty-based one.  First, the task of price regulation is itself a much-
disputed enterprise: price controls are criticised as costly, unnecessary, liable to abuse, and ultimately 
counterproductive.  Yet the pragmatic recognition that unrestrained competition does not guarantee efficient 
or otherwise socially desirable outcomes means that the ‘second best’ solution of regulation is sometimes 
preferable.  Effective controls require a close understanding of the relevant market, however, which links to 
the second friction, namely the sharing of regulatory jurisdiction between the EU and its Member States.  
The necessity and optimal scope of price controls may be most apparent domestically; yet differentiated 
regulation risks fragmentation, competitive distortions, and furtherance of national interests at the expense of 
integration.  The approach of EU law must accommodate these tensions, alongside the inherent paradox of 
restricting price freedom within an ostensibly open marketplace.   
                                                     
6 See, e.g., Commission Decision of 9 November 2010 in Case AT.39258—Airfreight, para.900: ‘Price being the main 
instrument of competition…’. 
7 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-148/15 Deutsche Parkinson EU:C:2016:394, para.18. 
8 Opinion in Deutsche Parkinson, para.1. 
9 Opinion in Vodafone, para.1. 
10 For discussion of the inherent tensions between the ‘social’ and ‘market’ within the internal market, see de Witte, “The 
Architecture of the EU’s Social Market Economy” in Koutrakos & Snell (eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of the EU’s 
Internal Market, Edward Elgar Publishing (2017). 
11 C-333/14 Scotch Whisky EU:C:2015:845. 
12 Regulation 717/2007 of 27 June 2007 on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community and 
amending Directive 2002/21/EC (OJ L171/32, 29.6.2007) (‘Roaming Regulation’). 
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The topic of price regulation is of great importance in practice within the EU, yet has been largely 
neglected within existing academic work.  We argue here that it merits greater consideration, for two 
principal reasons.  First, although viewed as a comparatively ‘old-fashioned’ instrument of market control, 
price regulation retains a notable prominence within the current EU legal framework.  This is undoubtedly 
because, reflecting an historical fondness for such interventions within many European countries,13 
considerable price regulation continues to occur within the internal market today.  Accordingly, the questions 
of whether, when and why EU law tolerates such intervention are of direct contemporary relevance at both 
EU and domestic levels.  Second, the treatment of price controls under EU law is recognised to raise 
exceptional issues in the context of both negative14 and positive15 integration efforts, yet the existing literature 
has again failed to explain what is so special or unusual about regulating price.   
This article aims to address the current scholarly gap by considering the mechanisms by which EU law 
interacts with, contrains and even mandates price regulation, in order to understand its distinctive status and 
often apparently inconsistent treatment.  To do so, it draws upon a wide range of recent jurisprudence, 
legislation and administrative practice related to internal market regulation, to develop a taxonomy of 
perspectives under EU law.  In identifying a tripartite balancing of competitive, integrationist and social 
concerns that underpin the approach to price regulation within the internal market, this article adopts a 
transversal approach, which endeavours to identify and analyse the treatment of analogous regulatory 
phenomena across differing areas of the EU legal framework.  The central argument advanced hinges upon 
an overarching tension which conditions the treatment of pricing restraints within EU law generally: namely, 
that price alone is a deeply imperfect signal for welfare-enhancing human behaviour, yet regulatory 
limitations on price freedom threaten to negate the basic entrepreneurial impetuses upon which the internal 
market ultimately is premised. 
The article is structured as follows.  It first considers price regulation generally, addressing its treatment 
in economic terms (Section II), and its place within the institutional and ideological structure of the EU 
(Section III).  Differing approaches under EU law are then considered: from a punitive approach under 
competition law (section IV); to a sceptical prohibitive approach under the free movement rules (section V); to 
a cautious yet more receptive permissive approach within certain sector liberalisation regimes (section VI); and 
an exceptional, essentially prescriptive approach incorporating price regulation into the fabric of the internal 
market (section VII).  Section VIII considers in a more rounded fashion the dilemma of price regulation 
                                                     
13 See e.g. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, OUP (1998). 
14 Discussing the atypical treatment of price regulation under the free movement provisions, see e.g. Barnard, The Substantive 
Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, OUP (2016), 87; Alemmano, “Balancing Free Movement and Public Health: The Case of 
Minimum Unit Pricing of Alcohol in Scotch Whisky,” 53 CMLRev 1037 (2016), 1047-51; and Opinion of Advocate General 
Bot in C-333/14 Scotch Whisky EU:C:2015:527, fn.53. 
15 Several of the most important cases considering the principle of subsidiarity concern EU-level efforts to control price 
regulation: see C-58/08 Vodafone EU:C:2010:321 and C-176/09 Commission v Luxembourg EU:C:2011:290. 
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under EU law, in particular its distinctive, often contradictory treatment and status.  Section IX concludes 
briefly. 
 
II. PRICE REGULATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
We start with the ambiguous virtues of price regulation as such.  Within neoclassical economics,16 the free 
operation of the price formation mechanism is vital to the effective and efficient functioning of competitive 
markets.  There is a default assumption that price should be determined, principally, by interaction of levels 
of supply and demand.  Assuming a degree of substitutability between products, price is the most immediate 
parameter upon which undertakings compete.  The price formation process moreover generates signalling 
effects which facilitate efficient behaviour.  High prices suggest that demand outstrips supply, indicating that 
a market is profitable and thus inviting entry—which, other things being equal, should lower prices due to 
increased competition.  Concomitantly, high prices force consumers to reflect upon the extent to which they 
value a product, resulting, in theory, in that scarce commodity being allocated to those who value it the 
greatest.  In this manner, the price mechanism leads to an efficient distribution of finite resources.   
The textbook understanding of market-clearing relies, however, upon assumptions which may not hold 
true.  High prices cannot prompt greater competition if there are barriers to market entry, so that supra-
competitive pricing and scarcity are prolonged.  Equally, barriers to exit may extend over-supply and wastage. 
Rational consumer behaviour is, moreover, premised upon complete information—not always a given, 
particularly where the product or service is complex—; an ability to switch or do without in response to 
price-gouging—again, not always possible, particularly in the context of necessary goods, like electricity—; 
and an absence of externalities.  Where private price formation delivers sub-optimal results, there is an 
argument for public pre-emption through regulation.17  The immediate objective of most price regulation is, 
self-evidently, to constrain independent price-setting, whether through a fixed price or rate of return, a 
maximum price ceiling or minimum price floor, or more oblique forms of regulation such as a prohibition on 
practices like below-cost sales.18 
Price controls are most frequently imposed in markets with natural monopoly or oligopoly components 
without free entry, where the undertaking(s) concerned are likely, absent intervention, to set prices near 
monopoly level.19 Here the rationale for regulation is, typically, to prevent consumer exploitation through 
excessive retail prices, or to avoid market foreclosure, where high wholesale prices obstruct downstream 
competition. As the examples below nonetheless illustrate, price regulation has been imposed by Member 
States and the EU to further an even broader range of regulatory objectives, including social concerns—for 
                                                     
16 Authoritative accounts include Mankiw & Taylor, Economics (3rd ed.), Thomson Learning (2014), particularly chpt.3. 
17 Generally, Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation, 2nd ed., OUP (2011), chpts.22 and 25. 
18 Decker, Modern Economic Regulation, CUP (2014), chpt.5. 
19 Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, CUP (2004), 25. 
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example, where prices for consumer essentials are maintained at lower levels, or for harmful goods at 
elevated levels—; or, more contentiously, to ‘stabilise’ ostensibly excessive competition.  Price regulation can 
thus play a redistributive role, by preventing transfer of (arguably unfair levels of) wealth from consumers to 
producers. Moreover, price regulation is often inextricably linked to other controls, including access or 
quality requirements.20 
Despite acknowledged weaknesses within price formation processes, price controls are the exception 
rather than the rule in contemporary practice.21 Hostility arises on multiple fronts.  Determining optimal 
regulated prices is a complex task.22  Regulators must ensure that regulated entities retain incentives to 
operate efficiently, while ensuring that profits are neither excessive nor unviable.  Regulation can have 
unintended negative consequences, such as rent-seeking, moral hazard, inefficient subsidies, or distortion of 
optimal supply and demand levels;23 or regulatory lag may arise, whereby evolving market conditions render 
the regulated price increasingly inappropriate.24  Indiscriminate application of controls might damage 
corporate incentives to invest, resulting in diminished innovation and a reduction in overall consumer 
welfare.25  More broadly, the provocative public choice literature launched a fundamental attack on regulation 
as an inherently flawed or even corrupt enterprise that benefits only the regulated at the expense of broader 
public interest.26  Although overstating the risk of capture,27 public choice was influential, alongside more 
measured critiques that considered the potential costs and inefficiency of regulation,28 in provoking efforts 
towards deregulation and regulatory reform.  Specifically, there has been a movement from prescriptive 
forms of ‘command-and-control’ regulation, including price controls, to alternatives such as incentive-based 
regulation, market-harnessing mechanisms,29 and ‘nudge’ strategies.30  In its own practice, the EU emphasises 
‘better regulation’31 and, increasingly, ‘smart regulation,’ defined as regulation ‘of the highest quality possible.’ 32   
 
III. PRICE REGULATION AND THE EU ‘ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION’ 
 
                                                     
20 Generally, Kahn, The Economics of Regulation, The MIT Press (1988). 
21 In most economies, price controls exist only within public utility sectors: Baldwin et al. (2011), 443. 
22 Generally, Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 4th ed., MIT Press, (2005). 
23 Viscusi et al. (2005), 663-69. 
24 Viscusi et al., 358. 
25 Baldwin et al. (2011), 476. 
26 See, e.g., Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation,’ 2(1) The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 3-21 (1971). 
27 See, e.g., Posner, ‘The Concept of Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History’ in Carpenter & Moss (eds.), Preventing 
Regulatory Capture, CUP (2014). 
28 See, e.g., Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, Harvard University Press (1982). 
29 See, e.g., the EU’s emissions trading scheme: Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L275/32, 
25.10.2003). 
30 Baldwin et al. (2011), 110-133. 
31 European Commission, Updating and Simplifying the Community Acquis (COM(2003)71 final), 2 February 2003. 
32 European Commission, Smart Regulation in the European Union (COM(2010)543 final), 8 October 2010, 3. 
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Beyond such critiques, price regulation poses specific difficulties—ideological and practical—within the legal 
framework of the EU’s internal market.  While not prohibited a priori, the application of price controls is an 
almost contradictory exercise within this broader context.  A core focus of this article is to explore how these 
tensions are manifested and accommodated within EU law. 
As noted, EU law interacts with price-setting processes in three dimensions: by constraining private 
price-setting, limiting domestic regulation, and—occasionally—functioning as a vehicle for direct control.33  
The task of constructing and regulating the internal market is a competence shared between the Union and 
Member States.34 Yet, while the core tension and trade-offs remain the same—when and to what extent 
should apparent market failures merit derogation from the archetype of open and undistorted 
competition?—the precise issues in each instance are quite distinct.  Quasi-price regulation via antitrust must 
grapple with an inherent paradox of the competition process: although high prices are the textbook example 
of monopoly abuse, the conventional understanding of the market mechanism is premised upon self-
maximising yet highly efficient price-setting by private actors.  Where national controls are at issue, the key 
questions are why and how the EU legal framework should intervene to constrain the domestic regulatory 
choices of Member States.  Where EU-level activity is under scrutiny, the questions are when and how the 
EU institutions should exercise their discretion, exceptionally, to mandate or impose price controls.  Across 
these distinct dimensions, there are nonetheless recurrent overarching complexities, which condition and 
inform the discrete approaches within EU law. 
First, price controls pose an ideological challenge, insofar as the internal market is premised upon open 
and undistorted competition.  As the Court of Justice argued in ANODE, the free functioning of the price 
formation mechanism is integral to this objective.35  Although it acknowledged in Metro (II) that price 
competition “does not constitute the only effective form of competition or that to which absolute priority must in all 
circumstances be accorded,” it nonetheless maintained that such competition “is so important that it can never be 
eliminated”.36   Emphasis is placed upon freeing markets not merely from private anticompetitive conduct, but 
also unnecessary or ineffective public restraints.37 While undistorted competition does not equate to 
unregulated competition, it reflects an ordoliberal preference for governmental interventions that aim, 
primarily, to buoy underlying market forces.38  In keeping with much modern economic theory, EU law has a 
distinct preference for solutions that reinforce rather than overreach the market system.39  State-imposed 
limitations on price competition, conversely, constitute ‘a particularly strong limitation of rights to property and the 
                                                     
33 See fn.9 above. 
34 Article 4(2)(a) TFEU. 
35 See fn.1 above. 
36 C-26/76 Metro (II) EU:C:1977:167, para.21. 
37 Recent pronouncements include C-100/05 Commission v Italy (Trailers) EU:C:2009:66, on free movement of goods, and C-
554/12 Commission v DEI EU:C:2014:2085, concerning Article 106(1) TFEU. 
38 Generally, Moschel, “The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective: The Example of 
Competition Policy” 157 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 3 (2001). 
39 Echoing Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Clarendon Press (1994), 30. 
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freedom of economic initiative.’40 Price regulation, insofar as it ‘necessarily influences the freedom of the undertakings 
concerned to act in the market in question and hence the process of competition,’41 is formally at odds with the underlying 
philosophy of the internal market. 
Second, and linked to the priority granted to buttressing market forces over dictating outcomes, the EU 
and its institutions operate at what Dashwood termed ‘the intermediate level of policy execution’.42  Although the 
principles of direct effect and primacy mean that EU law creates individual rights and duties, the EU typically 
regulates via Member States rather than through direct intervention in domestic markets.  This limitation, 
moreover, reflects the sharing of jurisdiction within a Union that remains much less than a federation.  The 
great bulk of price regulation within the internal market is devised and implemented nationally, with Member 
States demonstrating greater or lesser enthusiasm for intervention.  The perceived necessity and tenor of 
price regulation is, furthermore, motivated primarily by domestic considerations, which raises concerns about 
capture, the quality of regulatory activity, and its potential for distortive effects. 
Yet deference to domestic regulators can be defended insofar as the redistributive effects of price 
controls are legitimised by the political accountability of regulators and the link to a democratic mandate.43  
These legitimating forces are weaker for interventions originating in EU law, whether through positive or 
negative integration.44  Although criticism of the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ may be overstated,45 its 
infrastructure for democratic representation is a step further removed from citizens than in the national 
context.  Given the extent to which price regulation represents a departure from standard laissez-faire 
models—but also that it may reflect societal preferences for valuable non-economic policy objectives—it 
seems appropriate to require sufficiently robust authority and accountability.  Additionally, the nature of the 
regulatory process requires, typically, a detailed and nuanced understanding of the markets concerned, which 
may reinforce arguments for decentralisation.46  Increasing criticism of the EU’s one-size-fits-all approach to 
liberalisation,47 for instance, suggests that more intensive forms of sector reorganisation may require a closer 
tailoring to market circumstances.  (Conversely, the EU institutions are arguably better placed to understand 
the Union-wide implications of price controls.48)  Thus, the treatment of price regulation, occurring at a 
further remove from regulated markets than analogous domestic processes, must be alive to potential 
criticisms on the bases both of democratic authority and effectiveness. 
                                                     
40 Opinion in Vodafone, para.38. 
41 ANODE, para.30.  
42 Dashwood, “States in the European Union,” 23 ELRev 201 (1998), 213. 
43 Larouche, Competition and Regulation in European Telecommunications, Hart Publishing (2000), 124. 
44 Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, OUP (2005), 149-50. 
45 Compare Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union,” 40 JCMS 
603-24 (2002), and Follesdal & Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik,” 
44 JCMS 533-62 (2006). 
46 Barnard (2016), 17. 
47 See e.g. Mizutani & Uranishi, “Does vertical separation reduce cost? An empirical analysis of the rail industry in European 
and East Asian OECD Countries” 43 Journal of Regulatory Economics 31-59 (2013). 
48 De Witte, “Sex, Drugs and EU Law: The Recognition of Moral and Ethical Diversity in EU Law,” 50 CMLRev 1545 
(2013), 1553-54. 
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A third consideration draws upon the principle of subsidiarity, which governs the threshold question of 
when positive action at EU level is appropriate.49  Essentially a principle of regulatory restraint, subsidiarity 
limits the EU’s ability to act to situations where it is best placed to implement a top-down EU-wide solution.  
Linked to the notion that the EU remains ‘a constitutional order of States,’50 subsidiarity reflects both the 
Member States’ continued existence as sovereign states,51 and sustained resistance to centralisation or even 
federalisation of Europe.52  As Öberg argues, ‘the core of subsidiarity is the right of Member States to diverge’53—an 
(ostensible) right of particular relevance in the context of price controls.  
Positive efforts at price regulation—whether alignment of domestic regulatory structures, or price 
controls implemented directly through EU law—have generated some of the most notable challenges under 
the subsidiarity principle.54  As a shared competence, subsidiarity clearly constrains the EU when regulating 
the internal market.55 In the context of much price regulatory activity, this threshold requirement may be 
difficult to satisfy.  Price controls not only can and have been implemented successfully by national 
regulators, but the price-setting process benefits from a closer relationship between regulator and market.56  
Moreover, price controls involve significant incursions into both the economic independence of market 
actors and the residual freedom of Member States to make redistributive choices in respect of national 
economies.57  Where positive integration is at issue, subsidiarity suggests that intervention at EU level is likely 
to be appropriate only where there are clear cross-border concerns which, moreover, pose insurmountable 
hurdles to national regulators—what Öberg labels ‘transnational market failures’58.  Even where this may be the 
case, price regulation must be a proportionate response.59   
In areas of negative integration—for instance, where the Court of Justice scrutinises domestic 
controls—the principle of subsidiarity is not formally binding.  There is, nevertheless, an argument that the 
multi-layered constitutional structure of the EU means it ought to be respected in spirit.  That is, mere 
divergence that is reflective of differing national preferences should not be viewed as inherently suspect.60  
This is important when considering whether EU law ought to pre-empt domestic regulatory choices: in 
essence, we must consider which polity is entitled to make the sorts of policy choices, both economic and 
                                                     
49 Article 5(3) TFEU. 
50 Dashwood (2000), 216. 
51 Dashwood (2000), 211. 
52 Craig, “Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis,” 50 JCMS 72 (2012), 73. 
53 Öberg, “Subsidiarity as a Limit to the Exercise of EU Competences” Yearbook of European Law (forthcoming, 2017), 15. 
54 See fn.15 above. 
55 Article 4(2)(a), TFEU. 
56 Majone (2005), 149-50. 
57 Generally, Ho ̈pner & Scha ̈fer, “A New Phase of European Integration: Organised Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe” 
33 West European Politics 344 (2010). 
58 Öberg (2016), 8. 
59 Article 5(4), TEU. 
60 See also Andreangeli, “Making Markets Work in the Public Interest: Combatting Hazardous Alcohol Consumption through 
Minimum Pricing Rules in Scotland,” Yearbook of European Law (forthcoming, 2017), arguing that free movement should grant 
greater latitude to domestic policymaking under the principle of conferral. 
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social, reflected within price regulatory activity.61  This links, moreover, to the vital question of 
proportionality, meaning, here, the extent to which EU law should probe the appropriateness, in substance, of 
domestic policy choices.62   
The only area that escapes subsidiarity concerns is competition law, which comprises in effect instances 
of law enforcement against private firms.  Nonetheless, the Commission has long insisted that it “is not and 
does not wish to act as a price regulator” in this context,63 instead deferring to price-setting by (well-behaved) 
undertakings or domestic regulators.  Notably, such reluctance is reconcilable with the logic of subsidiarity 
insofar as national competition authorities (NCAs) are more receptive to case theories and concomitant 
remedies premised upon unfair pricing.64  Moreover, it perhaps reflects a deeper understanding of the 
rationale for regulatory restraint, or at least the dangers of over-instrusive intervention.   
Accordingly, for a variety of ideological, constitutional and even practical concerns, price regulation 
occupies an uneasy position within the legal framework of the EU’s economic constitution.  Disfavoured but 
not proscribed, its treatment reflects a compromise between the archetype of free competition, the 
imperative of effective market governance, and the peremptory nature of certain non-economic concerns.  
The complexity of the balancing exercise is demonstrated by the range of approaches discernible within case-
law and practice: a punitive approach penalising individual pricing practices, an antagonistic prohibitive approach 
that proscribes domestic controls, a permissive approach premised upon EU-level supervision of national 
regulation, and a prescriptive approach involving positive top-down regulation. Yet within each, broadly 
equivalent tensions can be seen, from issues of technical expertise and democratic authority, to the balance 
between self-determination and containment of distortive domestic preferences.65 Each approach will be 
examined in turn, bearing in mind these overarching considerations. 
 
IV.  PRICE REGULATION VIA ANTITRUST: THE PUNITIVE APPROACH 
 
We consider first EU competition law, the central concern of which is prevention or control of aggregations 
of market power that, ultimately, enable undertakings to raise prices to supra-competitive levels.66  Here, 
price regulation is an essentially reactive punitive device; reflecting a determination that an undertaking’s 
pricing practices exceed the permissible limits of its default freedom to engage in price competition.67  Large 
swathes of EU competition law are addressed directly at price-setting, whether the concern is the manner in 
which prices are set or the effects that pricing structures may have on the wider market.  Yet competition 
                                                     
61 Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? OUP (1999), 63. 
62 See e.g. C-94/04 Cipolla EU:C:2006:758, para.61. 
63 European Commission, XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy (1997), 29. 
64 See fn.106 below. 
65 De Witte (2013), 1546-56. 
66 See e.g. European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (OJ C45/7, 24.2.2009), para.19, and T-472/13 Lundbeck EU:T:2016:449, para.386. 
67 C-62/86 AKZO v Commission EU:C:1991:286, para.70. 
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experts, including the Commission acting as antitrust enforcer,68 typically resist conceptualising competition 
law as price regulation as such.  In this section we explain, first, why the competition rules might be viewed 
as an instrument of price regulation; second, limitations to this approach in theory and practice; and third, 
recent developments that suggest an increased quasi-regulatory role in future. 
Our focus is the antitrust rules in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, prohibiting anticompetitive coordination 
and abuse of dominance respectively.69  At first glance, competition enforcement provides the most 
immediate and flexible legal means to exert control over pricing, facilitating intervention at source by 
inhibiting or limiting the ability of economic actors to set prices at anticompetitive levels.  These provisions 
thus represent a punitive model of regulation, insofar as firms may be punished for exclusionary or 
exploitative prices which offend against their proscriptions. 
Characterising competition law as an instrument of price regulation has both negative and positive 
aspects.  On the one hand, Articles 101 and 102 constrain the freedom of undertakings to set and charge 
whatever prices they wish: a freedom that is, moreover, the nominal basis of the entire free-market system.  
Infringement warrants sanctions against offending firms, typically fines.  On the other hand, illegitimate 
prices are ‘regulated’ via enforcement activity to acceptable levels, whether directly as an aspect of the 
remedies imposed or indirectly by consequence of condemning existing prices.  The almost inevitable 
outcome of enforcement against anticompetitive prices is that a revised pricing structure is imposed, which is 
dictated—more or less closely—by the requirements of the competition rules.  Moreover, EU competition 
law provides a versatile and wide-ranging mechanism for intervention: enforceable by the Commission;70 the 
various NCAs;71 and, increasingly, private litigants before national courts, whose activities ostensibly 
complement and reinforce public enforcement.72 
Yet the reality of EU competition enforcement, particularly by the Commission, is considerably 
removed from the archetype of price regulation.  First, the Commission favours interventions that alleviate 
or prevent market foreclosure, and thus buoy competitive forces, rather than interventions that second-guess 
the workings of the competition process.  Even where price lies at the heart of an investigation, there is 
considerable resistance to the notion that antitrust provides an appropriate vehicle by which to identify 
acceptable—or unacceptable—prices as such.  Second, the task of price regulation implies not only the 
identification of appropriate pricing levels but also the availability of some coercive mechanism by which to 
impose publicly-devised prices on private actors going forward.  Again, however, antitrust is an area where 
                                                     
68 See fn.63 above. 
69 While pricing commitments in merger proceedings may result, obliquely, in de facto regulation, such remedies are deeply 
disfavoured and, at least in theory, wholly exceptional: see Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 (OJ C267/1, 22.10.2008), para.17.  
70 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L1/1, 4.1.2003), particularly Chapter III. 
71 Regulation 1/2003, particularly Articles 3 and 5. 
72 C-453/99 Courage v Crehan EU:C:2001:465. 
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the Commission has conventionally shied away from prescriptive remedies, although the coercive power of 
its considerable fines is undisputed.   
The one area where antitrust collides unavoidably with the territory of conventional price regulation is 
the control of excessive pricing by dominant undertakings, as provided by Article 102(a) TFEU. Yet it is 
precisely in that context that both Commission and Court of Justice have exercised their most notable degree 
of regulatory restraint.  Such reticence almost certainly reflects a broader scepticism regarding the advisability 
of antitrust enforcement against high prices as such; critiques which challenge the quasi-regulatory 
deployment of antitrust more generally.  Recurrent concerns include the immediate difficulty, from an 
antitrust perspective, of distinguishing permissible and impermissible price levels, coherently and 
consistently;73 alongside longer-term risks to incentives for innovation and investment.74  Moreover, the 
remedies required, typically equivalent to command-and-control regulation, are considered more appropriate 
for sector-specific regulators to impose and monitor, for reasons of both capacity and accountability.75  
There is, accordingly, a consensus that, absent high barriers to entry or expansion, ‘the market should, in 
principle, be able to self-correct in the short to medium term: high prices should normally attract new entrants or encourage 
existing competitors to expand.’76   
Thus, the clear focus of recent competition enforcement—at least outside the cartel context—has been 
against behaviour that results in anticompetitive foreclosure, with, moreover, a clear end-goal of open (and 
not merely re-regulated) market structures. In what follows we consider the conventional limitations to 
antitrust as a vehicle of price regulation, as well as recent developments that may suggest a greater role for 
competition law.   
 
(i)  Pricing as a Concern of Competition Law 
First, competition enforcers in the EU, as elsewhere, are less concerned with absolute prices than with the 
structure and functioning of markets.  While pricing is an integral element of many competition cases, it is 
rarely the ultimate concern; a distinction that may be illustrated by reference to recurrent theories of harm 
under both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.   
Under Article 101 TFEU, coordinated efforts to set prices are inherently suspect: any concertation that 
‘constitutes an attempt to influence free formation of prices…manifestly has as its object to restrict competition.’77  Most 
obviously, Article 101 prohibits price-fixing between ostensible competitors, particularly in the context of 
                                                     
73 O’Donoghue & Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing (2006), 621-22; Motta, Competition Policy: 
Theoru and Practice, CUP (2004), 69; Evans & Padilla, “Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrable Legal 
Rules,” 1 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 97 (2005), 110-13; and Akman & Garrod, “When are Excessive Prices 
Unfair?” 7 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 403 (2011). 
74 O’Donoghue & Padilla (2006), 622-25. 
75 O’Donoghue & Padilla (2006), 627-28. 
76 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in C-177/16 AKKA EU:C:2017:286, para.48. 
77 Opinion of Advocate General Spzunar in C-74/14 ETURAS EU:C:2015:493, para.68. 
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hard-core cartels.  Most horizontal price-setting cases are clear-cut—albeit not quite ‘per se’78—violations of 
Article 101(1), although more ambiguous activities are also prohibited.79 Article 101(1) has similarly been 
invoked against vertical price-setting, especially resale price maintenance (RPM).80  The argument that an 
agreed price is ‘fair’ (or reflects the competitive level) is largely irrelevant to its permissibility, although this 
may serve to exempt the arrangement under the Article 101(3) exception rule.   
Under Article 102 TFEU, the default approach is quite different: the concept of open and undistorted 
competition necessarily relies upon unilateral price-setting by economic operators, and indeed many argue that 
it is the lure of potential monopoly profits that ultimately drives competition and innovation.81  Nonetheless, 
even in the context of single-firm conduct the Commission is concerned with pricing practices by dominant 
undertakings that foreclose markets or exclude competitors.82  Potential price-related abuses include fidelity-
inducing rebates;83 low prices with predatory effect;84 margin squeezes involving a disjuncture between 
wholesale and retail prices charged by vertically-integrated undertakings;85 price discrimination;86 and 
constructive refusals to deal, whereby high access prices constitute an effective refusal to supply.87   
Thus, in most cases where pricing practices are challenged, the core concern is not the price in itself, but 
rather its broader context or market impact.  Conspiracy is the implicit evil of cartels: ostensibly independent 
economic operators colluding to extract greater profits.  Cartels are likened to theft offences,88 a 
characterisation reflected in increasing use of criminal sanctions.89  RPM is disfavoured, not only because it 
softens competition and can lead to immediate price increases, but also because it may facilitate collusion, 
diminish innovation, or inhibit entry by efficient suppliers.90  Foreclosure is the core concern of exclusionary 
pricing under Article 102,91 as reflected by the Commission’s ‘as efficient competitor’ standard to govern 
intervention.92  This is seen vividly in the treatment of predatory pricing, perhaps the most counterintuitive 
of abuses: a dominant firm with ‘deep pockets’ distorts the market by attracting customers with unrealistically 
low short-term prices, intending to drive competitors from the market and entrench its dominance longer-
                                                     
78 In theory, any breach of Article 101(1) may be justified under Article 101(3): T-17/93 Matra Hachette EU:T:1994:89, para.85.  
The Commission, however, is sceptical that hardcore restraints like price-fixing might satisfy the exemption criteria: Guidelines 
on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (OJ C101/97, 27.4.2004), para.46. 
79 See e.g. C-286/13 Dole EU:C:2015:184. 
80 See e.g. C-161/84 Pronuptia de Paris EU:C:1986:41. 
81 Opinion in AKKA, para.117. 
82 Enforcement Priorities, paras.23-27. See also O’Donoghue & Padilla (2006), 603. 
83 See e.g. C-413/14 Intel EU:C:2017:632. 
84 See e.g. C-202/07 France Télécom EU:C:2009:214. 
85 See e.g. C-280/08 Deutsche Telekom EU:C:2010:603. 
86 See e.g. T-228/97 Irish Sugar EU:T:1999:246. 
87 See e.g. C-7/97 Oscar Bronner EU:C:1998:569. 
88 See, e.g., Commissioner Neelie Kroes, Taking Competition Seriously—Antitrust Reform in Europe (SPEECH/05/157), Brussels, 
10 March 2005: “…when we break up cartels, it is to stop money being stolen from customers’ pockets.” 
89 See e.g. Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement, OUP (2014). 
90 European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (OJ C130/1, 19.05.2010), para.224. 
91 Enforcement Priorities, para.19. 
92 Enforcement Priorities, para.23.   
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term.93 In each instance, the underlying objection is not that the price charged in itself is unacceptable, but 
rather that it has been determined, or affects the market, in an anticompetitive manner. 
The principal exception is Article 102(a), which expressly cites as an example of abusive conduct, 
‘directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices’.  The Court of Justice in United Brands 
confirmed that this prohibition applies where dominant firms charge a price that is disproportionate, or bears 
no reasonable relationship, to the economic value of the product concerned.94  It applied a demanding two-
part test to determine excessiveness: requiring that, first, the difference between costs incurred and price 
charged was excessive, and second, the price charged was unfair in itself or compared to competing 
products.95  Yet more recently in AKKA, the Court clarified that the so-called ‘United Brands test’ is not 
exhaustive.96  It accordingly accepted that excessiveness might be established, inter alia, through consistent 
comparison with prices in other Member States, adjusted where necessary to take account of relative 
purchasing power, provided that any differences were significant and persistent.97  The complexities inherent 
in this evaluative exercise, however, were highlighted by Advocate General Wahl: from a risk of 
counterproductive false positive errors, to problems of ex ante uncertainty for firms, and administrative costs 
associated with on-going monitoring and enforcement.98  He thus argued that excessive pricing should be 
held exist, if at all, only in markets with regulatory barriers to entry yet absent effectual supervision by sector 
regulators,99 given that such problems are consequently amenable to neither self-correction nor regulatory 
supersession.    
Perhaps unsurprisingly, for many years the Commission pursued excessive pricing claims only 
exceptionally.100  Beyond the Commission’s stated reluctance to act as ‘price regulator,’101 its own economic 
experts counselled against intervention,102 and exploitative abuses are a notable omission from guidance on 
the Commission’s enforcement priorities.103   A rejection decision from 2004 is instructive: although prices 
were high, the services provided were particularly valuable, and thus it could not be established that price 
bore no reasonable relationship to value.104  While the prices charged may have been suboptimal, this 
decision exemplifies Advocate General Wahl’s contention that antitrust cannot fruitfully concern itself with 
                                                     
93 AKZO, paras.70-72. 
94 C-27/76 United Brands EU:C:1978:22, para.250. 
95 United Brands, para.252. 
96 C-177/16 AKKA EU:C:2017:689, para.37. 
97 AKKA, paras.38&55. 
98 Opinion in AKKA, paras.103-105. 
99 Opinion in AKKA, paras.48-49. 
100 Gal, “Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offence in the US and the EC: Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly?” 49 
Antitrust Bulletin 343 (2004), 376. 
101 European Commission, XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy (1997), 77. 
102 Report by the EAGCP, An Economic approach to Article 82, July 2005, p.11. 
103 Enforcement Priotities, para.7. 
104 Commission Decision of 23 July 2004 in COMP/A.36.568/D3—Scandlines v Port of Helsingborg. 
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any claimed deviations from a perfectly competitive price, but must restrict itself to those which are 
unambiguously problematic.105 
Yet this apparent orthodoxy is not immune from challenge.  Most obviously, NCAs have proven more 
receptive to exploitative concerns, pursuing Article 102 cases with an exploitative element—particularly 
excessive pricing—at more than double the rate of the Commission over the first decade of decentralised 
enforcement under Regulation 1/2003.106  Such a division of labour is consistent with our observations 
regarding the distinctive subsidiarity concerns raised by price regulation, even though the principle has no 
binding effect here: NCAs are arguably better placed to identify pricing practices raising public policy 
concerns, and to take and implement such—effectively redistributive—decisions.    
Yet certain areas of the Commission’s recent enforcement practice, too, disclose a greater concern with 
unfair prices.  A first group of cases involves commitment decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.  
In effect, this procedure provides a flexible vehicle by which to tackle more complex—and often 
contentious—case theories, making it well-suited to address on-going pricing problems.  The commitment 
procedure, and relevant decisions, are considered below.   
A second group involves horizontal price-fixing in the context of payment systems.  Here, the 
Commission has pursued a series of enforcement actions, some as infringement decisions107 and others as 
commitment decisions,108 against multilateral interchange fees (MIF) agreed by financial institutions that 
operate payment card networks.  Notably, in these cases the primary concern is not that the price-setting 
activity is anticompetitive, but rather that the agreed price is excessive compared with an optimal competitive 
price.  The outcome in each instance has accordingly been, rather than abandonment of the MIF mechanism, 
instead a substantial lowering of existing fee levels.  Such cases therefore evince greater concern with ultimate 
(re)distribution than with operation of the competition process, disclosing a distinctly regulatory mentality.  It 
was not unexpected, therefore, that the EU institutions subsequently opted to overreach the market 
mechanism with a top-down Regulation setting maximum MIF levels across the internal market, a 
development considered further in section VII below. 
Finally and most prominently, following several high-profile enforcement actions taken by NCAs,109 the 
Commission has expressed greater willingness to intervene specifically against excessive prices that result in 
consumer exploitation. While reiterating a default position that ‘[t]he last thing we should be doing is to set ourselves 
up as a regulator, deciding on the right price,’ Competition Commissioner Vestager nonetheless argued that the EU 
                                                     
105 AKKA, paras.101-107 & 128. 
106 European Commission, Staff Working Document on Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003 (COM(2014)453), 
9 July 2014, paras.65-73. 
107 Commission Decision of 19 December 2007 in COMP/34.579—MasterCard, COMP/36.518—EuroCommerce and 
COMP/38.580—Commercial Cards (OJ C264/8, 6.11.2009); upheld on appeal in C-382/12 P MasterCard EU:C:2014:2201. 
108 Commission Decisions in COMP/39.398—VISA MIF of 8 December 2010 (OJ C79/8, 12.3.2011) and 26 February 2014 
(OJ C147/7, 16.5.2014). 
109 See, e.g. Competition and Markets Authority, Unfair pricing in respect of the supply of phenytoin sodium capsules in the UK, Case 
CE/9742-13, 7 December 2016. 
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has ‘a responsibility to the public’ to tackle excessive pricing in certain instances, particularly relating to vital 
consumer products.110  This culminated in a formal investigation into alleged ‘price-gouging’ in the 
pharmaceutical sector, an investigation the Commission describes as the first of its kind.111  It coincides, 
moreover, with greater emphasis on the extent to which competition enforcement might secure, not merely 
the high-level goals of efficiency and market interpenetration, but also the more tangible, though politically-
loaded, objective of increased societal fairness.112  While scepticism exists as to whether such developments 
represent legitimate popular or more troubling populist concerns,113 a renewed focus on the symptoms of 
market power rather than its causes reflects implicit acknowledgement that the promise of ‘open and 
undistorted competition’ may be insufficient to protect consumer welfare.   
 
(ii)  Remedial Structures available in Competition Cases 
The second way in which competition enforcement conventionally diverges relates to the outcomes of 
regulatory action.  Whilst price regulation culminates in a specified pricing structure requiring adherence by 
regulated firms, competition enforcers are more reluctant to ‘pick winners’.  Even where antitrust imposes 
negative obligations proscribing particular pricing practices, on-going positive duties to charge specific prices, 
determined ex ante and applying to future market behaviour, are more problematic conceptually and more 
unusual in practice. 
Conventionally, the primary enforcement mechanism for EU competition law has been Commission 
infringement decisions.  The express wording of Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 empowers the Commission 
to “impose on [defaulting undertakings] any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement 
committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end.”  Yet the Commission has, typically, restricted 
itself to (increasingly high) fines, and, where ambiguity exists as to whether an infringement is continuing, a 
formal statement requiring it to be brought to an end; this might entail, as in Microsoft, binding obligations to 
resolve on-going problems.114 Accordingly, infringement decisions often proscribe existing anticompetitve 
price-setting arrangements or price structures, but do not prescribe the ‘competitive’ price going forward.  As 
the Microsoft saga demonstrates, ostensibly proscriptive remedies can become prescriptive where difficulties 
                                                     
110 Speech of Commissioner Vestager, “Protecting Consumers from Exploitation,” Chillin’ Competition Conference, 
Brussels, 21 November 2016. 
111 European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission opens formal investigation into Aspen Pharma's pricing practices for cancer 
medicines, IP/17/1323, Brussels, 15 May 2017. 
112 Speech of Commissioner Vestager, “Competition for a Fairer Society,” 10th Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement 
Symposium, Georgetown, 20 September 2016. 
113 Lamadrid de Pablo, “Competition Law as Fairness,” 8 JECLAP 147 (2017). 
114 T-201/04 Microsoft EU:T:2007:289, confirming Microsoft’s obligation to provide interoperability information to resolve a 
refusal to supply. 
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arise in implementing the original sanction.115  Nonetheless, at least initially, Article 7 decisions adhere to the 
tort-crime model of antitrust.116   
As such, infringement decisions are of limited use for direct price-setting: such decisions inform market 
participants of prices that they cannot charge, rather than those they must.  The strict proportionality 
requirement within Article 7 has been advanced to explain the Commission’s reluctance to deploy it more 
robustly to include, inter alia, pricing obligations,117 insofar as the Commission has the burden of establishing 
that such remedies are suitable, necessary and represent the least restrictive alternative.118  Yet arguably this 
also reflects an ‘antitrust’ as opposed to ‘regulatory’ approach to market governance: freeing the market of 
barriers to competition, but not second-guessing what the competitive outcome might entail. 
Two recent developments suggest, however, that any rigid dichotomy between ostensible ‘antitrust’ and 
‘regulatory’ remedial structures is misplaced, thus mirroring well-established critiques of US antitrust resulting 
from its consent-decree practice.119  The first and more speculative change, advocated by certain scholars120 
and hinted at in the recent ARA Foreclosure decision,121 is a possibility that the Commission becomes more 
forceful in applying its little-used remedial powers under Article 7.  ARA notably involved, alongside a 
finding of infringement and fines, an obligation on the defendant to divest certain infrastructure to avoid 
future abuses.  While the facts are unusual—the defendant had a de facto statutory monopoly, the divesture 
commitment was offered by the undertaking, and it received a discounted fine in return—the decision 
suggests greater willingness by the Commission to use its Article 7 powers in a more muscular, multi-
dimensional fashion.122 
The second, more significant development lies in the commitment procedure under Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003.  This enables the Commission to conclude investigations without any finding of breach, 
based on binding commitments by the undertaking(s) concerned to modify their behaviour or structure. Two 
aspects of the procedure facilitate its application to achieve quasi-regulatory outcomes such as price controls.  
First, given that Article 9 decisions do not entail any formal finding of breach,123 and because the consensual 
nature means that appeal is unlikely,124 it is unsurprising that recurrent use has been made of the procedure to 
conclude cases that involve more contentious or novel theories of harm, including those targeted directly at 
                                                     
115 Microsoft was subsequently fined an additional €860 million for failure to provide the mandated information: T-167/08 
Microsoft EU:T:2012:323. 
116 See e.g. Crane (2008) “Antitrust Antifederalism” 96 California Law Review 1, 14-15. 
117 Wagner-Won Papp, “Best and even better practices in commitment procedures after Alrosa: The dangers of abandoning 
the “struggle for competition law”” 49 CMLRev 929 (2012). 
118 C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa EU:C:2010:377, para.39. 
119 See, e.g., First, “Is Antitrust Law?” 10 Antitrust 9 (1995). 
120 Wagner-Von Papp (2012), 960. 
121 Commission Decision of 20 September 2016 in AT.39759—ARA Foreclosure (OJ C432/6, 23.11.2016). 
122 See e.g. Wollmann, “ARA Foreclosure: A Step Towards ‘Consent Decrees’ in EU Antitrust Proceedings” 8 JECLAP 167 
(2017). 
123 Pursuant to Recital (13), Regulation 1/2003, the Commission cannot find infringements or impose fines in Article 9 cases. 
124 Appeals have been brought by third parties: see C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa EU:C:2010:377, and T-342/11 CEEES 
EU:T:2014:60. 
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unfair pricing.  Examples include S&P,125 premised explicitly upon the setting of “unfairly high fees;” 
Rambus,126 involving so-called ‘patent ambush,’ in effect an excessive pricing claim coloured by a standard-
setting context; and several decisions against Visa,127 alleging in essence excessive prices following co-
ordinated price-setting. For the Commission, commitment decisions present a benign mechanism by which 
to conclude arguably more dubious cases, including the sorts of quasi-regulatory theories that might require 
on-going pricing commitments for resolution.   
Second, unlike the largely retributive function of infringement findings,128 Article 9 decisions aim to 
identify and implement prospective solutions to on-going market problems.  Whilst some commitments are 
one-off, others involve continuing obligations to specific behaviour.  Most notably, in several cases the 
agreed remedy has involved future pricing commitments: whether a fixed price (S&P, IBM129), a percentage 
value (Rambus, VISA) or both (RICS130).  Moreover, Article 9 decisions, unlike the infringement 
procedure,131 may involve voluntary commitments to adhere to monitoring structures, an important addition, 
for instance, to the commitments in RICS following market-testing.   
The scope for Article 9 to facilitate and legitimate the use of competition law as a vehicle for price 
regulation should not be overstated, however.  First, commitment decisions are available only in a subset of 
cases, excluding cartels and serious non-cartel abuses.132  Second, such decisions require the consent of 
defendants: commitments cannot be imposed unilaterally, so Article 9 decisions are excluded where 
defendants refuse to cooperate or fail to offer sufficiently persuasive commitments.  At most, therefore, 
commitment decisions approximate to a form of co-regulation between the Commission and, crucially, willing 
defendants.  As noted, voluntarism was similarly a key element of the hybrid procedure in ARA.  Finally, 
concerns have been raised about the commitment procedure qua legal (rather than regulatory) instrument, 
particularly the extent to which it introduces uncertainty to the underlying antitrust rules, given that Article 9 
decisions do not, formally, represent statements of competition law.133  Thus, the Commission has signalled 
an intention to make greater use of Article 7 where clear precedents would be of value.134  Yet such an 
approach may impede its application in precisely the sorts of quasi-regulatory pricing cases that, as discussed, 
lie at the boundaries of contemporary competition law.   
 
                                                     
125 Commission Decision of 15 November 2011 in COMP/39.592—Standard & Poor's (OJ C31/8, 4.2.2012). 
126 Commission Decision of 9 December 2009 in COMP/38.636—Rambus (OJ C30/17, 6.2.2010). 
127 See fn.108 above. 
128 See e.g. Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 
101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C167/19, 13.6.2013), para.1.   
129 Commission Decision of 13 December 2011 in COMP/39.692—IBM Maintenance Services (OJ C18/6, 21.1.2012). 
130 Commission Decision of 20 December 2012 in COMP/39.654—Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs) (OJ C326/4, 12.11.2013). 
131 In Microsoft, paras.1271-1278, the General Court held that the Commission cannot, in an infringement decision, impose a 
monitoring trustee on defendants. 
132 According to Recital (13), Regulation 1/2003, excluding “cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine.” 
133 See fn.123 above. 
134 See, e.g., “Interview with Johannes Laitenberger, Director-General for Competition, European Commission” The Antitrust 
Source, June 2017 
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(iii) Competition Law as a Corrective to Domestic Price Regulation 
Finally, consideration must be given to a further, disputed, intersection between price regulation and EU 
competition law, namely application of the latter to conduct already subject to domestic controls.  Under the 
restrictive ‘State action’ doctrine, the mere fact the market behaviour is subject to ex ante sector-specific 
regulation does not immunise the undertaking concerned from application of competition law, unless the 
regulatory framework either removes any possibility for independent (anti)competitive activity or all scope 
for competitive forces to arise.135 The ostensible justification is that sector-specific regulation and 
competition law pursue discrete policy objectives, so that undertakings must ensure that their market 
behaviour conforms with each set of legal obligations.136  A more sceptical explanation, however, is that 
sector-specific regulation is almost invariably enacted and enforced domestically, though it may originate in 
EU-level Directives.137  Accordingly, in many antitrust cases in which State action issues arise, at the heart of 
the dispute lie claims regarding the distortive effects of national rules. 
Deutsche Telekom provides a vivid illustration of how such conflict can extend to price controls.  Here, 
the incumbent telecommunications operator in Germany, DT, was held to have engaged in an abusive 
margin squeeze by maintaining an insufficient spread between wholesale and retail prices for fixed-line 
telephone access.138  The case theory proceeded on the basis that wholesale prices were set by the domestic 
regulator, while retail prices had been approved under a maximum price cap applying to a ‘bundle’ of retail 
products.  Despite the apparent pervasiveness of regulatory influence, DT was considered to have sufficient 
residual freedom to avoid the squeeze, and indeed, a ‘special responsibility’ to take steps to do so.139  Yet at 
the core of the antitrust case lies a different clash, namely Germany’s failure to implement 
telecommunications tariff rebalancing, contrary to its obligations under EU law.140  Thus, a supranational 
public dispute between the EU and its Member State over the appropriateness of domestic price regulation 
was effectively repackaged as one involving private manipulation of price formation, enabling the Commission 
to dismantle the problematic regulatory structure de facto, without the complications of the de jure procedures 
available to challenge national rules.141 
The approach of Deutsche Telekom and its implications foreshadow the scepticism that the Commission 
and Courts frequent demonstrate towards both the design and implementation of domestic price regulation.  
Not only does the case give little weight to the appropriateness or authority of price-setting by the national 
regulator; moreover, the defendant was granted only the slightest allowance to reflect the comprehensiveness 
                                                     
135 Deutsche Telekom, paras.80-82; see also C-359/95 P & C-379/95 Ladbroke Racing EU:C:1997:531, paras.33-34 
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139 Deutsche Telekom, paras.176-181. 
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of the pricing constraints it faced, namely a 10% reduction in fine.142  An analogy might be drawn to the 
principle of legality and its limitations within EU law, pursuant to which an undertaking may not claim a 
legitimate expectation in or seek to rely upon an unlawful act.143  The failure to give substantial import to the 
domestic regime suggests, implicitly, that it could not be considered a legitimate feature of the domestic 
market; presenting neither a plausible defence for the defendant’s pricing practices nor a reasonable (albeit 
imperfect) estimation of appropriate price levels in the German telecommunications markets.  We return to 
this sceptical perspective below. 
 
At this juncture, two principal takeaways emerge.  The first is a notable regulatory restraint, apparently 
premised on the idea that de facto price regulation is an inappropriate task for the EU in its guise as 
competition regulator.  (A degree of restraint perhaps more remarkable given the frequent criticism that the 
Commission is too willing to intervene under competition law in other contexts.144)  Thus, we see a first 
instance of the idea that regulating prices is ‘special’—or especially disfavoured—under EU law.  Influenced 
by Chicago School thinking, Advocate General Wahl provided a searing exposition of these concerns: public 
interference with the private price formation mechanism almost invariably generates suboptimal results, 
given both the elusiveness of any would-be competitive price and the high cost and risks of intervention.145  
The oblique attack on national price regulation in Deutsche Telekom further accords with this logic.  Yet greater 
receptiveness in recent practice, expressly premised on pursuit of a fairer society, belies the notion that open 
and undistorted competition is invariably the best route to enhanced consumer welfare.  We shall see this 
tension reoccur in the scenarios examined in sections V to VII. 
Second, the procedural powers available at EU level appear to make a significant difference to 
substantive outcomes.  Specifically, antitrust enforcement moves closest to the archetype of price regulation 
with the commitment procedure, whereby the Commission has formal powers to make binding and enforce 
any regulatory bargain agreed.  Yet, under Article 9, pricing remedies remain a ‘bargain’ in a literal sense, 
insofar as ostensibly regulated entities must agree to and indeed nominally propose their own restraints.  A 
question thus arises as to whether there is scope for a more coercive approach to pricing remedies in antitrust 
cases where defendants are unprepared to make the necessary concessions, or whether the risks of erroneous 
and counterproductive intervention outweigh potential benefits.  Moreover, marked asymmetry exists 
between proscribing existing pricing practices and prescribing ostensibly optimal ‘competitive’ prices going 
forward.  Such asymmetry reoccurs in the examples discussed later in this work, and thus we might ask 
                                                     
142 Deutsche Telekom, para.279. 
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whether the concerns identified and solutions reached in this essentially micro (i.e. firm-level) context have 
resonance in the more macro context of the relationship between the EU and Member States. 
 
V. INDIRECT PRICE REGULATION I: THE PROHIBITIVE APPROACH 
 
We move from price-setting by private entities to price regulatory activity by public entities, whether Member 
States or the EU itself.  Arguably, the default approach within the internal market is, in keeping with its 
ideological tenor generally, one of deep scepticism and reluctance towards price regulation. We term this the 
prohibitive approach: as a derogation from the precept of open and undistorted competition, price controls are 
incompatible with the EU legal framework unless justified by a legitimate and proportionate objective. This 
suspicion is illustrated, implicitly albeit most convincingly, by the sheer absence of direct price controls 
within positive EU law.  Instead, most EU legal rules addressing this question concern efforts to constrain or 
prohibit price controls implemented domestically, most obviously under the free movement rules. 
The fundamental rules guaranteeing free movement within the internal market provide its foundation, 
prohibiting domestically-imposed obstacles to the circulation of goods, services, establishment, workers and 
capital between Member States.  Price regulation poses a conceptual conundrum here.  Price controls are 
close to the antithesis of free unencumbered competition between private market actors, and thus present a 
fundamental departure from the archetype of ‘open’ competition underpinning the internal market.  Yet, 
formally, the free movement rules are unconcerned with barriers to competition as such, but instead, with 
barriers to trade (and, by consequence, competition) between different national markets that comprise the 
discrete components of the ostensible single market. While EU law pursues the clear goal of market 
interpenetration through removal of barriers to trade, the internal market does not mandate that such trade is 
wholly unregulated domestically, provided that national regulatory frameworks do not impose implicit 
barriers to foreign competition.  Free movement is not precisely equivalent to ‘free markets,’ therefore, 
insofar as the latter implies unrestricted economic activity more generally.146   
Famously, in Keck, the Court of Justice drew a conceptual distinction between national rules that limit 
the commercial freedom of all economic operators, whether originating in the home or another Member 
State, and those which make life more difficult for foreign manufacturers or service providers, and thus hinder 
market interpenetration.147  Domestic price controls clearly limit the ability of traders to determine, privately 
and independently, the price of goods or services.  As such, price regulation has the potential to dampen and 
distort competition in absolute terms.148  Provided such regulation disadvantages domestic and foreign 
traders to an equivalent extent, however, it cannot constitute a barrier to trade between Member States, but 
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merely a restriction on trade within the national market.  Unlike other ostensible ‘selling arrangements,’149 
moreover, price controls do not generate an obvious incumbency advantage for established domestic 
operators, by, for instance, imposing positive obstacles to entry150 or restricting the possibility of cross-
border sales151—beyond, of course, making the market potentially less profitable and thus less desirable to 
entrants.  Moreover, the mere fact that certain Member States refrain from regulating prices, or do so less 
restrictively, cannot imply that more exacting regulation elsewhere poses an obstacle to free movement.152 
Convincing though this logic may be, the Court of Justice subsequently proved more receptive to 
arguments that apparently neutral controls impose barriers to accessing national markets which constitute a 
particular disadvantage for traders from other Member States.  While acknowledging the residual freedom of 
Member States to regulate absent EU-level harmonisation, the Court has held that price controls might 
obstruct the free movement of, variously, goods,153 services154 and establishment.155  The Court’s reasoning 
suggests a deep appreciation of the significance of price within the market process, in terms of both the 
competitive vitality and economic viability of economic actors.  This, in turn, arguably links to ordoliberal 
thinking on the centrality of individual economic freedom within the economic constitution.156  These cases 
thus reflect the ideological tension that arises where domestic controls limit or distort competition within the 
ostensibly free internal market—a tension particularly apparent in recent decisions.157  These dual concerns 
may help to explain why, in evaluating the treatment of price regulation, one leading commentator suggests 
that, without saying so explicitly, the Court views such cases as a distinct—and arguably unique—category.158 
On the one hand, price controls may hinder access to national markets by limiting the competitive vitality 
of traders from other Member States: as the Court of Justice held forcefully in Deutsche Parkinson, ‘price 
competition lays the basis for [foreign traders’] potential to access the [host] market directly and to continue to be competitive in 
it.’159 Cases in this vein recognise that price is the most immediate parameter of competition.  Where 
regulation restricts, de jure, the ability of new entrants to compete on price, this may have the effect, de facto, of 
preventing entrants from competing at all. This might be the case where particular products can be produced 
more cheaply in the home Member State—echoing the classic Ricardian notion of comparative advantage—
yet where fixed or minimum price controls within the host Member State prevent the foreign trader from 
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reaping the competitive advantage of its lower costs.160  Alternatively, regulation may deprive entrants of the 
effective competitive strategies necessary to break into new markets and increase market share.  Price 
controls may prevent entrants from engaging in innovative pricing practices, which might distinguish their 
products from those of domestic incumbents;161 from using price competition to overcome reputational or 
other incumbency advantages of established domestic undertakings;162 or, where foreign traders are at a 
disadvantage in the quality of the product they can provide, from compensating customers through lower 
prices.163  Finally, limitations on price competition may stifle the ability of entrants to compete via higher 
quality, where the effect is to prevent foreign traders from offering products which, though more costly, 
represent added value for consumers.164   
On the other hand, price controls may hinder access by threatening the economic viability of new entrants.  
Achieving a positive equilibrium between income and costs is necessary to ensure that entrants can remain 
within the marketplace and potentially develop as effective competitors.  Price regulation might function to 
exclude foreign traders, however, where a fixed or maximum selling price is set at an unreasonably low level 
in comparison to their costs.165  Such an outcome may arise where a pricing scheme is devised only by 
reference to the situation of undertakings established in the host Member State, which differs from that of 
foreign undertakings.166  Here, the domestic controls generate what is in effect a margin squeeze between 
costs incurred by the foreign trader upstream and the maximum price obtainable downstream.  The effect is 
that the foreign trader cannot compete profitably—and in the longer-term, probably cannot compete at all—
in the host Member State.167  Cases of this variety thus grapple with a limitation inherent within the truism 
that competition policy ought to protect the competitive process rather than competitors: although the latter 
might introduce inefficiencies in the short-term, in the longer-term the existence of rivals is indispensable to 
healthy competition. 
Finally, several recent cases hint at a more fundamental objection to price regulation, reflecting the 
antithetical nature of price controls within an ostensibly free market.  Chief amongst these is Scotch Whisky.  
In holding that domestic regulation of alcohol pricing constituted a ‘measure having equivalent effect’ (MEE) 
contrary to Article 34 TFEU, the Court spoke broadly about the potential for price regulation to impinge 
upon ‘the free formation of prices,’168 which ‘constitutes the expression of the principle of free movement of goods in conditions 
of effective competition.’169  Such language suggests that the concern with price regulation is not merely that it may 
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disfavour foreign traders, but that it may create an inherently uncompetitive market structure which 
disadvantages all traders—and, consequently, consumers—regardless of origin. 
Care ought to be taken against reading too much into a single judgment.  First, the phrase, ‘the free 
formation of prices,’ was introduced by the Advocate General170 specifically in relation to the CMO Regulation 
for agricultural products,171 although the Court adopted this wording more broadly.172  Moreover, in 
concluding that the impugned controls constituted a MEE, the Court endorsed the reasoning of the 
Advocate General,173 who emphasised the extent to which the regulation might cancel out the competitive 
advantage of imports,174 thus aligning with established case-law.175  Yet, the apparently expansive language 
chimes with the earlier decision in Commission v Italy, where the Court spoke of price regulation as a potential 
impediment to market access—contrary, in that instance, to Articles 49 and 56 TFEU—insofar as it might 
deny entrants the opportunity to compete ‘under conditions of normal and effective competition’ within the host 
Member State.176  Again, this suggests that it is not merely the potentially discriminatory impact of such 
regulation, but rather its distortive effects more broadly, that conflict with the principle of open 
competition.177  Although the Court in Commission v Italy concluded that the regulation did not, in fact, hinder 
market access, it did so on the basis that, in practice, it permitted independent price-setting, thus allowing 
‘proper remuneration’178—and, implicitly, allowing the market mechanism to function.  A principled 
objection to interference with the price formation mechanism may also explain the Court’s vehemence in 
Deutsche Parkinson, which celebrates the virtues of price competition in the strongest terms.179  
Regardless of the conceptual basis upon which price regulation constitutes a barrier to free movement, 
Member States retain the possibility of justifying such controls by reference to proportionate countervailing 
public policy considerations. It is here that the domestic impetus behind price regulation is of paramount 
significance: whilst EU law acknowledges the importance, and possible precedence, of certain ‘non-economic 
public policy aims,’180 not every domestic concern provides a legitimate reason to deviate from open 
competition.  To exempt prima facie restrictive regulation, Member States must demonstrate that it ‘serves 
overriding requirements relating to the public interest, is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and 
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does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it’.181  The burden on proof lies with Member States,182 
emphasising the presumption that national obstacles to price competition conflict with EU law.   
In scrutinising any public policy objective advanced to justify price regulation, a core question is the 
extent to which EU law can or should presume to ‘second guess’ the policy choices of Member States.  The 
free movement rules are not a prescription for legislative harmonisation,183 and Member States retain 
freedom for divergent regulation within their confines.  Price regulation, alongside the domestic policy 
concerns that underpin it, is often an inherently political activity,184 both in its initial recognition of legitimate 
countervailing non-economic values and in the choice of regulatory mechanisms deployed to protect or 
further those values.185  To that extent, as Advocate General Spzunar recognised, ‘[i]t is obviously not for the 
Court to interfere in national political and democratic processes and to prejudge certain political choices.’186  Yet, as cases like 
Essent,187 Viking,188 and Laval189 demonstrate in different contexts, the fact that fundamental domestic policy 
considerations are at issue neither excludes application of the free movement rules nor means the latter must 
yield to the former.  Balancing the objective of establishing the internal market against ‘sensitive matters of a non-
economic nature’190 is, therefore, ‘a delicate task’.191 
Member States have relatively broad latitude in identifying public policy concerns that might, in theory, 
justify restrictions on price competition.  Echoing our discussion in section II above, the Court accepts that 
price controls might further such objectives in various ways. Upper limits can enhance consumer protection 
by preventing price gouging, particularly where consumers lack market power.192  Price regulation may 
encourage practices viewed as socially desirable—such as consumer saving193—or, conversely, discourage 
undesirable practices—such as alcohol abuse.194  More problematic are cases where controls play a 
‘moderating role,’195 to neutralise perceived ‘excessive’196 or ‘ruinous’197 competition.  Here, the regulatory 
concern is that price competition might unbalance the existing market equilibrium by, for instance, 
encouraging ‘cream-skimming’ behaviour that neglects peripheral or vulnerable consumers198 or less 
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profitable product categories,199 or which leads to a deterioration in quality as suppliers cut costs to cut 
prices.200  While the Court is not unreceptive to such concerns,201 justifications of this variety may shade into 
purely economic arguments, which cannot provide a legitimate ground for derogating from free movement.202 
The mere existence of a valid public policy concern does not automatically legitimate domestic controls, 
however, as Member States are furthermore bound by the principle of proportionality.  Any regulation must 
therefore be limited to measures that are both suitable and necessary to achieve the relevant public policy 
objective.203  The exactingness with which the proportionality criterion is applied is, arguably, the decisive 
aspect of the balancing of domestic and EU-level interests.  Advocate General Bot thus argued for ‘a certain 
degree of restraint’ in this analysis:204 both in order to grant Member States some discretion over policy choices 
on issues of, primarily, domestic concern,205 and because of the inherent ambiguity of the exercise, which 
involves a measuring and balancing of fundamentally different (and, sometimes, intangible and even 
unknowable) phenomena.206  In Scotch Whisky, the Court adopted a reasonableness standard to assess whether 
the proportionality requirement was satisfied;207 an approach that ostensibly gives Member States a certain 
leeway, reflecting the once-removed status of the EU institutions to the essentially domestic choices that 
underlie most regulation.208   
Yet, the Court’s recent decisions on price regulation suggest, in practice, a more exacting approach than 
the language of reasonableness implies.  The Court shows few qualms about questioning, and effectively 
second-guessing, domestic choices in an area acknowledged to be of significant importance—human 
health—and one which, moreover, lies primarily within the competence of Member States.209  In Scotch 
Whisky, a decidedly unconvinced Court indicated that, although minimum pricing might be suitable to combat 
alcohol misuse, it should not be considered necessary, insofar as a tax increase could achieve the same result in 
a less restrictive manner.210  (A viewpoint rejected, notably, when the case returned to the domestic level.211)   
More trenchantly, in Deutsche Parkinson, the Court rejected categorically Germany’s assertion that fixed 
prices were suitable to protect the supply of medicinal products by supporting a network of bricks-and-mortar 
pharmacies, despite the referring court’s view that regulation was the only means available (and thus, necessary) 
to achieve this outcome.  Although the holding may be explained partly by an absence of plausible 
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evidence,212 the case is nonetheless remarkable for the willingness of the Court to substitute its own (equally 
subjective) reasoning for that of the delinquent Member State. Of particular significance is its receptiveness 
to certain—markedly hypothetical213—arguments advanced by the Advocate General to provide a counter-
narrative to that of the Member State, including suggestions in respect of the potential effects of price 
competition;214 and, in a manner arguably conflating ought with is, the ways in which internet-only pharmacies 
might serve all segments of the population.215  Thus, the Court effectively questioned the substance of the 
domestic policy choices.216  What remains unclear is the source of this hostility: whether the Court was 
concerned about poor quality national regulation, or, echoing public choice critiques, whether it suspected a 
disjuncture between stated and actual regulatory motives.  Either antagonism brings attendant dangers: an 
unduly rigorous and somewhat speculative proportionality analysis risks slipping from a judicial to full-merits 
review standard; whereas questioning the underlying motives of Member States arguably runs contrary to the 
principle of mutual trust that is demanded, at least of Member States, under EU law.  Ultimately, the key 
question is why the Court of Justice is better placed to make such essentially normative determinations, 
whether based on technical expertise or its pan-Union perspective.217  The apparent willingness of the Court 
to embrace substantive review stands in marked contrast, moreover, to its reluctance to perform a similar 
function under the subsidiarity principle in the context of price regulation originating at EU level.218 
Where, more exceptionally, Member States involve private market actors in the public task of price 
regulation, the broader EU competition framework may provide an alternative avenue to scrutinise and 
prohibit such behaviour.  As noted, where anticompetitive price-setting is carried out by undertakings 
themselves, it may be caught by Articles 101 or 102.  To avoid situations where equivalent private interests 
are cloaked in public authority and escape scrutiny, those prohibitions—read with Article 5 TEU (duty of 
loyal cooperation)—impose obligations on Member States.219  This may be the case where Member States 
require or encourage abusive price-setting by dominant undertakings or the adoption of rate-fixing 
agreements, or where national rules lose the character of public legislation when responsibility is delegated to 
private operators for decisions affecting the economic sphere.220  Alternatively, where anticompetitive pricing 
structures are maintained by an undertaking yet attributable to a state measure, the Member State may be 
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accountable under Article 106(1) TFEU.221  If, however, price regulatory activity is necessary to ensure 
provision of so-called ‘services of general economic interest,’ Article 106(2) TFEU may, in theory, exempt 
the behaviour from application of, inter alia, competition law.222   
 
VI. INDIRECT PRICE REGULATION II: THE PERMISSIVE APPROACH 
 
Although an openly sceptical approach typically governs ad hoc domestic price regulation, within a narrower 
subset of economic conditions there is greater recognition of, if not the desirability of price controls, at least 
their inevitability. Reflecting a pragmatic recognition of the sometimes necessity of intervention, the ‘lesser 
evil’223 is to centralise and standardise arrangements for domestic regulation through an overlay of more 
permissive, essentially supervisory EU rules.  Price controls are not inherently suspect, yet the discretion of 
Member States is constrained, with an underlying assumption that the scope for resultant distortions is 
similarly diminished. 
While the granular details of these supervisory schemes differ between sectors,224 those circumstances 
where default hostility is replaced by tentative tolerance share characteristics which inform and influence the 
tenor of supervision.  First, each of the sectors concerned has been subject to some degree of EU-level 
liberalisation or harmonisation, which sought to transform tightly-controlled and segmented national markets 
into contestable and competitive components of the internal market.  EU law was thus the catalyst for 
creation of the market forces which Member States might subsequently seek to restrict.  Adoption of positive 
legislation also suggests pan-Union interests that might be imperilled through disparate domestic controls.   
Second, in each sector, liberalisation has not, however, involved a complete realignment of market 
governance rules with an EU-level archetype.225  Member States retain scope to adopt divergent regulation, 
with possible disruptive effect.  Absent deeper harmonisation—which, in the areas concerned, would prove 
politically contentious and potentially inefficient—the more pragmatic approach may be to accept the 
possibility of diversity but minimise its potentially disruptive impacts.   
Finally, the sectors concerned are, typically, marked by structural features—economies of scale, network 
effects, natural or legal monopoly components—which mean that unregulated market activity is unlikely to 
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generate ‘effective’ competition even after ostensible liberalisation, so that the ordinary price formation 
mechanism may generate suboptimal outcomes.226  These difficulties are reflected, inter alia, in the frequency 
with which antitrust enforcement has been deployed against individual pricing practices.227  Moreover, in the 
background in most instances are societal concerns—such as public service provision, or public health—that 
extend beyond the purely economic. These factors explain why domestic price controls are implemented with 
notable frequency in such markets: ‘[l]iberalisation, if it is not to be at any cost to individuals, makes a certain amount of 
regulation necessary when the market does not function adequately.’228  These economic and social features provide a 
rationale for acceptance of regulation as a ‘lesser evil’. 
The electricity sector, where the continued presence of natural monopoly segments creates persistent 
structural barriers to competition, provides a clear example.  Here, although the ultimate objective is to 
secure ‘transparent market-based mechanisms for the supply and purchase of electricity,’229 the liberalisation 
framework acknowledges the continuing necessity for price supervision.  The Third Electricity Directive 
expressly permits Member States to impose public service obligations with respect to, inter alia, price.230  It 
moreover requires Member States to ensure universal service for households (and, where preferred, small 
enterprises), premised upon ‘reasonable, easily and clearly comparable, transparent and non-discriminatory 
prices.’231  The Directive also mandates regulatory approval of wholesale-level transmission and distribution 
tariffs,232 reflecting the potential for inefficient pricing practices upstream to create bottlenecks to retail 
competition.  This reflects the ‘essential facility’ nature of such infrastructure, a parallel to the realm of 
antitrust,233 thus recognising the extent to which unduly high input prices may have knock-on negative effects 
downstream.  Consistent with the logic of the permissive approach, however, the liberalisation framework 
does not determine access prices; instead, this is delegated to national regulators, albeit acting within the 
circumscribed EU supervisory framework. 
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Within the telecommunications sector, where EU liberalisation has had greater success,234 the treatment 
of domestic regulation is less generous.  Here, liberalisation is explicitly premised upon the progressive 
reduction of ex ante regulation as competition develops.235  Thus, there is an express preference for retail and 
wholesale arrangements negotiated ‘on a commercial basis’,236 which implies price-setting in accordance with 
ordinary principles of supply and demand. While the liberalisation framework provides explicit authorisation 
for domestic price controls where necessary,237 this option is only available following a finding that one or 
more operators hold ‘significant market power’.238  This mirrors the antitrust notion of dominance,239 
premised upon an absence of competitive constraints, thus suggesting that ordinary price-setting processes 
cannot work well in the circumstances.240 Nonetheless, regulatory interventions must avoid ‘market 
distortion’241 that would prove counterproductive on balance.  Market assessments are subject to periodic 
review,242 with an obligation to remove existing regulation where the threshold requirement is no longer 
met.243  Furthermore, the Commission has progressively narrowed the list of markets in which controls might 
be warranted.244  Accordingly, despite express recognition of the residual permissibility of price regulation 
even within ostensibly liberalised markets, the discretion of Member States is significantly curtailed, at least 
acting qua telecommunications regulators.245 
The Directive on Airport Charges246 provides further variation.  While the explicit aim is to establish a 
common regulatory framework for charges at major EU airports,247 the Directive stops far short of 
specifying prices.  Instead, it establishes a series of ‘common principles’248 that govern ‘the essential features 
of airport charges and the way they are set’.249  Beyond these, the Directive is notably permissive in terms of 
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the procedure or methodology to be followed,250 whether charges are set by airport operators or public 
regulators,251 and the absolute level of fees.  The primary objective is to regulate the relationship between 
airport management authorities and users (i.e. airlines), and specifically, to prevent abuse of market power by 
the former.252  Yet, pursuit of this goal requires neither centralisation nor full harmonisation: it is sufficient 
simply to guide domestic price-setting through a series of EU law obligations that are non-negotiable, but 
hardly unduly onerous. 
Finally, a ‘peculiar’253 form of supervision is contained in the Transparency Directive,254 which regulates 
price-setting for medicinal products.  Such controls accommodate multiple policy considerations: securing a 
consistent supply of necessary medicines; minimising expenditure of finite public resources; and protecting 
private incentives for research and innovation.  Against this background, the Directive acknowledges the 
prima facie legitimacy of regulation, whether imposed directly through price controls, or indirectly through 
purchasing activity of national health systems.  It nonetheless seeks to constrain the discretion of Member 
States—and minimise potential obstacles to free movement—by imposing procedural requirements, 
including time-limits and a duty to give reasons.  As Deutsche Parkinson illustrates, these comparatively high-
level obligations have proven insufficient to avoid (perceived) market distortions.  Yet the failure of efforts to 
strengthen and update the Transparency Directive,255 due to ‘no foreseeable agreement’ among legislators,256 
demonstrates the national sensitivities and divergent interests at play. 
Together, these examples illustrate both the overarching logic of the permissive approach and the extent 
to which the details of each regime depend upon the specific market dynamics. By structuring national 
decision-making for price regulation, whether by limiting the circumstances in which controls are permissible 
or by mandating the procedures to be adopted, in each instance the EU-level supervisory framework limits, 
but does not remove completely, national discretion.  Consistent with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, both of which prioritise the ‘least restrictive alternative,’ these examples are concerned with 
setting ‘rules of the game,’ but not prejudging actual results.  Recurrent use is made of principles of good 
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governance—including timeliness,257 transparency,258 non-discrimination,259 consultation,260 objectivity,261 
and verifiability262—which bind and constrain Member States when engaging in price regulation.  This 
structural approach, on the one hand, seeks to influence but not predetermine the substantive scope of 
domestic controls; on the other, it serves to pry open often opaque and perhaps murky domestic processes to 
greater scrutiny, at both national and EU levels.263  Each of the examples discussed above, moreover, involve 
duties to inform the Commission of measures to implement the required decision-making framework and/or 
of specific decisions taken under it.264  These obligations serve a twofold purpose: to condition and constrain 
domestic policymaking insofar as it takes place, overtly, in the ‘shadow of hierarchy;’ and to provide early 
warning of inadequate domestic structures or distortive controls. 
The underlying objective is to depoliticise price regulation, turning it into a largely technocratic 
enterprise. By constraining the discretion of Member States and throwing light on regulatory processes and 
outcomes, EU law seeks to limit the extent to which domestic regulation might favour vested private or 
public interests at the expense of the competition process.  The permissive approach shares with the public 
choice movement a scepticism regarding the inherent unreliability of regulators, but not, it seems, the 
regulatory enterprise more generally.  Implicit is a suspicion that, left to their own devices, national regulators 
may favour domestic over Union interests, or social over economic ones.  Yet the answer is not, as public 
choice would have it, to abandon or prohibit price regulation entirely.  Instead, EU law seeks the more 
constructive path of channelling domestic regulators towards better policymaking, with due regard, amongst 
other things, for competition implications.   
 This is illustrated by an increasing use of rigorously independent national authorities to implement and 
administer supervisory requirements.  Both the electricity and telecommunications frameworks mandate 
legally distinct and functionally independent national regulators.265  Each authority must exercise its powers 
impartially and transparently,266 including a prohibition on seeking or taking instruction from other bodies, 
public or private.267  Such requirements are intended to increase the authority of domestic regulators and the 
predictability of their decisions, in order ‘to remove any reasonable doubt as to the neutrality of that body and its 
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imperviousness to external factors’.268  Implicit is the assumption that exposure to such factors would diminish the 
effectiveness of domestic regulatory activity, coupled with a strong conviction of the relative efficiency of 
bureaucratic regulation in contradistinction to political decision-making.  The Airport Charges Directive 
similarly requires establishment of ‘national independent supervisory authorities’ to mediate in the event of 
failure to reach agreement on charges.269  More radically, one proposed innovation within the (now failed) 
revisions to the Transparency Directive was the requirement for a designated independent body to impose 
penalties against defaulting Member States where regulators fail to comply with time-limits.270   
The permissive approach emphatically does not give carte blanche to Member States, however.  A 
corollary of the constrained discretion permitted is that, where exceeded when imposing price controls, the 
errant Member State stands in violation of EU law.  That is, the mere fact that the EU legal framework 
envisages the possibility of price regulation does not equal a presumption that any domestic controls are 
acceptable.  The energy sector illustrates this tension.  As discussed, EU law not only contemplates price 
regulation in the electricity and gas sectors, but indeed requires a degree of supervision in wholesale markets.  
Following its energy sector inquiry, the Commission was nonetheless strongly critical of regulated retail tariffs, 
which it argued could have ‘highly distortive effects and…pre-empt the creation of liberalised markets.’271  Starting in 
Federutility,272 and reaffirmed in ANODE,273 the Court of Justice has split the difference by confirming the 
continuing power of Member States to imposed retail controls, while articulating demanding requirements, 
procedural and substantive, to be satisfied where Member States exercise that power.  The latter proved a 
stumbling block in Commission v Poland, where, regardless of whether market circumstances merited 
intervention, the price controls at issue—unlimited in time, and applicable without distinction to all 
consumers—represented a disproportionate incursion into liberalised gas markets.274  Prices determined by 
the interplay of supply and demand thus remain the preferred option and final objective.275  Ultimately, even 
when EU law adopts a more permissive approach to price regulation, domestic controls may prove 
incompatible with the internal market.  
 
 
VII. DIRECT PRICE REGULATION: THE PRESCRIPTIVE APPROACH 
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Finally, we consider more direct or interventionist means by which EU law seeks to control pricing, namely, 
‘by regulating prices at [Union] level.’276  Such regulation contrasts with more indirect approaches, in which EU 
law has an essentially negative function, ‘imposing limits on national regulations on prices’.277  It also contrasts with 
ad hoc regulation via antitrust enforcement, providing, at least in theory, systematic solutions to market 
failures rather than punitive responses to individual conduct.  Such regulation is explicitly recognised by the 
Court of Justice as ‘exceptional,’ justified only in ‘unique’ circumstances.278 Two examples will be considered, 
exploring the rationales for and broader implications of this approach. 
Of the indirect methods of price regulation, the prohibitive approach is an essentially polarised one: the 
EU prerogative of developing and protecting market competition pitched against Member State interest in 
restricting a competitive parameter.  The more permissive approach is largely cooperative: the EU and 
Member States collaborate to devise and implement controls that strike an appropriate balance ‘between the free 
market and regulation, between competition and the implications of the general interest’.279  Cooperation breaks down only 
where Member States exceed the terms of the permission granted by the EU law.  At their core, however, 
both reflect the ideological challenge of price regulation within ostensibly free markets: the former is 
unavoidably viewed as a deviation from the archetype of the latter.  Moreover, both presuppose a dichotomy 
between EU law—as a centralising, neutralising force, on course towards ever-greater competition—and 
national laws—as a source of divergence and distortion.   
Our final approach, conversely, addresses several—highly atypical—instances in which EU law is itself a 
vehicle for harmonised price controls imposed directly within domestic markets.  In a sense, these examples 
are closer to the punitive approach discussed in section IV, whereby the operative dichotomy is similarly a 
distinction between private market action and EU-level public control.  It is thus unsurprising that both were 
preceded by antitrust enforcement.  Yet the underlying approach to market supervision is, from another 
perspective, wholly at odds with the philosophy behind the competition rules: rather than discrete 
interventions to eliminate specific anticompetitive conduct, instead these examples demonstrate a complete 
overreaching of the price formation mechanism. 
An overt commitment to open and undistorted competition pervades conventional responses to market 
dysfunction under EU law: namely, reinforcement of existing competitive dynamics—whether by structural 
reform, removing regulatory restraints that inhibit competition, or antitrust enforcement against private 
actors—as opposed to overstepping those forces through price controls.280  To the extent that EU law makes 
provision for price regulation, typically it does so through alignment of domestic processes towards a Union 
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archetype.  This ‘intermediate’281 approach arguably reflects the most appropriate allocation of ‘proper political 
accountability’282 between the EU and Member States, given the plurality of ‘legitimate regulatory goals’283 that 
might be pursued.  Despite such reservations, however, EU law retains the formal capacity to embrace more 
prescriptive interventions through ex ante price controls: devised and imposed at EU level, taking effect 
within national markets, and applying directly to the activities of private actors.  The two examples we 
consider are the Roaming and Interchange Fee Regulations. In both instances, the control mechanism 
comprises a price ceiling, from which domestic regulators have little or no ability to deviate.  Bearing in mind 
the logic of subsidiarity, these examples raise questions about when and why such exceptional EU-level 
regulation is warranted. It is thus necessary to understand and compare the objectives behind and regulatory 
circumstances of both Regulations.  Although the sheer dearth of such legislation limits our sample size, it is 
possible to discern recurring themes which may serve to explain the precedence granted to EU-level action. 
The Roaming Regulation sets EU-wide prices for mobile roaming services. ‘Roaming’ occurs when 
mobile customers use their phones abroad.  To supply coverage, home providers purchase wholesale 
network access within host Member States.  Historically, rates for wholesale access were high, reflected in 
equally inflated retail prices.  Identified as a dysfunctional market by a Commission sector inquiry,284 the issue 
was initially pursued through antitrust enforcement and ‘soft’ law efforts.285  When these failed to generate 
reductions in rates,286 the Commission chose a more distinctly ‘regulatory’ solution: an EU-wide maximum 
for wholesale access, plus a limitation on the permissible retail mark-up to 130% of wholesale prices.287  This 
sought to address the ‘core problem’ that prices for roaming stood ‘in no meaningful relationship to the underlying 
costs,’288 resulting in ‘unjustifiably high’ charges.289  Entering in force in 2007290 and initially covering only voice 
calls, it was extended to text messages291 and internet data, while costs were reduced progressively.292  Finally, 
from June 2017, roaming surcharges have been abolished outright within the EU.293 
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Our second example concerns interchange fees for payment cards.  Interchanges fees comprise the 
costs levied by card system operators to merchants that accept payment, and have long been subject to public 
criticism and regulatory scrutiny.294  These concerns were reflected in the Commission’s sector inquiry into 
retail banking, which identified, inter alia, large variations in fees across Member States alongside generally 
high levels. 295  Initially, antitrust enforcement was considered sufficient to address these problems;296 
eventually, the Commission opted for a more durable approach with a specific Regulation on fee-setting.297  
The core function of the Interchange Fee Regulation is to cap maximum permissible fees for consumer 
credit and debit transactions involving four-party payment card schemes, such as Visa and MasterCard.298  In 
devising fee levels, the Commission took account of both economic theory and existing administrative 
practice;299 the Regulation thus sets maximum fees of 0.2% for consumer debit card transactions and 0.3% 
for consumer credit card transactions.300  The key pricing provisions took effect from December 2015. 
Despite factual differences, numerous elements unite these distinct examples, which may explain their 
regulatory priority within EU law.  First, both markets were subject to considerable scrutiny within the 
framework of the EU’s competition policy powers prior to enactment of the relevant Regulations.  This indicates 
the pre-existence of significant market dysfunction; circumstances that were, moreover, a source of 
substantial EU-level concern.  Commission sector inquiries, appropriate where ‘circumstances suggest that 
competition may be restricted or distorted,’301 were carried out in each, illustrating the importance of these 
markets within the context of the internal market.  Both inquiries revealed a risk of high pricing resulting 
from excessive market power;302 which in each instance prompted competition enforcement, pursuing such 
behaviour from an antitrust standpoint.303  Yet the subsequent decisions to regulate demonstrate both the 
intrinsic limitations of regulation through antitrust enforcement, and the value-added of ex ante price controls 
to address persistent market power. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
292 Regulation 531/2012 of 13 June 2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (OJ 
L172/10, 30.6.2012). 
293  Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending 
Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and 
Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (OJ L310/1, 
26.11.2015). 
294 See, e.g., Malaguti & Guerrieri, Multilateral Interchange Fees: Competition and regulation in light of recent legislative developments, 
European Credit Research Institute Research Report No.14, January 2014, 17-18.   
295 Communication from the Commission, Sector Inquiry under Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on retail banking (Final 
Report) (COM(2007)33 final), 31 January 2007. 
296 See fns.107 and 108 above. 
297 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on interchange fees for card-based 
payment transactions (COM(2013)550 final), 24 July 2013. 
298 Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions (OJ L123/1, 
19.5.2015) (‘Interchange Fee Regulation’), particularly Article 1.   
299 COM(2013)550, 8. 
300 Articles 3&4, Interchange Fee Regulation. 
301 Article 17(1), Regulation 1/2003. 
302 See fns.284 and 295 above. 
303 Other activities within both sectors have similarly attracted antitrust scrutiny: see T-328/03 O2 (Germany) EU:T:2006:116, 
and T-461/07 Visa Europe EU:T:2011:181. 
 36 
In the case of roaming, competition law proved largely incapable of addressing the exploitative 
oligopolistic behaviour at issue, meaning that regulation was necessary to secure an effective outcome. 
Although investigations were pursued against network operators, alleging abuse of dominance through 
excessive wholesale pricing,304 such efforts suffered from difficulties in establishing dominance, alongside the 
inherent stringency and uncertainty of the United Brands test to demonstrate excessiveness.305 The 
Commission alluded to the ‘complexity’ of enforcement,306 and, once the Roaming Regulation was adopted, 
it closed on-going investigations without findings of breach.307   
Interchange fees, by contrast, come readily within the ambit of Article 101 TFEU.  As discussed in 
section IV, antitrust enforcement has included commitment decisions involving Visa,308 and an infringement 
decision against MasterCard.309  Despite these successes, the piecemeal and essentially individualised nature 
of the remedies implemented provided an inadequate response to the systemic market failure at issue. The 
Commission thus determined that a top-down regulatory approach was required in lieu of ‘ad hoc’310 efforts. 
Second, in each instance the rationale for regulation was not merely a desire to increase efficiency: both, 
additionally, reflect social and integrationist concerns.  Consumer protection was a key impetus for the Roaming 
Regulation, as high costs were perceived as exploitative of non-business travellers in particular.311  Thus, the 
Commission called for ‘a clear demonstration that Europe can act in the interest of citizens in a case where Member States 
are not equipped to act.’312  For the Interchange Fees Regulation, it was small and medium-sized merchants—
who pay interchange fees in the first instance, and lack the economic clout to negotiate favourable rates 
individually—that shouted loudest (and lobbied hardest) for intervention.  In both instances, price regulation 
was the means by which access to these increasingly important products could be secured, on realistic terms, 
primarily for the benefit of individuals and businesses without substantial market power.  Significantly, in 
each case the ostensible social concern had a pan-Union existence or identity, thus warranting recognition at 
EU level.  This contrasts with the divergent social concerns that prompt domestic price regulation, which, as 
discussed, are granted only circumscribed deference. 
Additionally, both sectors involve significant cross-border elements.  Accordingly, their effective 
functioning—including affordable access—links to development of the internal market, thus providing a 
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plausible rationale for the necessity and appropriateness of EU-level intervention.   By its nature the levying 
of additional costs for use of mobile phones between Member States constitutes a barrier to integration and 
free movement: indeed, market segmentation is inherent within roaming as a service category.  Although the 
internal market element is not intrinsic to payment cards, card systems are a central component of e-
commerce infrastructure.  A well-functioning integrated payment market is accordingly portrayed as vitally 
important, if not practically indispensable, to development of the digital internal market,313 again particularly 
from the perspective of ordinary consumers and smaller businesses.  Notably, both roaming and the 
development of e-commerce are components of the Commission’s wider—and wildly ambitious—‘Digital 
Single Market’ strategy.314  In both instances, therefore, the Commission grounded its subsidiarity analysis in 
the transnational nature of the markets—and market failures315—at issue.316  
Article 114 TFEU accordingly provides the legal basis for both Regulations.  Although providing wide-
ranging legislative powers, formally Article 114 does not grant the EU legislature any ‘general power to regulate 
the internal market’.317 Hence, it was necessary to establish a ‘disfavouring of cross-border economic activity,’ 
and not merely a hindrance of economic activity as such.318  Both Regulations proceed on the assumption 
that, absent EU-level regulation, disparate and potentially distortive national price controls were likely to 
arise.319  An interesting question is whether the EU would have authority to legislate absent domestic 
divergence: that is, might the EU legislature intervene purely to address inefficient or otherwise socially-
undesirable price-setting by private actors?  Arguing tentatively in the affirmative in Vodafone, Advocate 
General Poaires Maduro drew parallels to Viking and Laval, which involved application of the free movement 
provisions to private parties due to ‘the direct impact that private acts…could have on free movement’.320  Where 
private economic activity involves a direct disfavouring of cross-border trade, he argued, the EU legislature 
should have capacity to regulate that behaviour. Where it involves wholly domestic trade, however—for 
instance, efforts to control the price of ‘suitcases or restaurant meals’321—the necessary link to cross-border trade 
is lacking.  In such circumstances, the task of price regulation, if necessary, falls to Member States unless an 
alternative legislative basis exists.322 
It is worth comparing, finally, the differing scope of the regimes.  In one sense, the Roaming Regulation 
is more intensive and ambitious. It mandates wholesale- and retail-level controls, on the basis that wholesale 
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regulation alone would not ensure that savings pass to consumers, while retail regulation without a reduction 
in costs might create a margin squeeze.323  Moreover, the Commission’s ultimate objective was the complete 
elimination of roaming charges, essentially rendering the service category obsolete (at least within ‘fair use’ 
parameters).  The progressive reduction in rates might be viewed as akin to forcing the internal market, 
insofar as operators must price as if a single market for mobile telephony services exists; whereas, in reality, 
mobile markets remain segmented along national lines.  The Interchange Fee Regulation is less far-reaching 
in this regard.  The Commission rejected a complete ban on interchange fees for debit cards on the basis that 
the market was insufficiently mature,324 and similarly rejected retail regulation, implicitly suggesting that this 
might intrude too far into private economic activity.325  
Yet the ultimate reach and impact of the Interchange Fee Regulation may be much greater than that of 
the Roaming Regulation.  The latter involves a deep incursion into commercial freedom, yet confined within 
narrow circumstances.  The Interchange Fee Regulation, conversely, addresses a broader subject-matter—
payment card transactions—and governs fees for cross-border and domestic consumer card transactions.  In 
practical terms, it represents a significant step beyond regulation in furtherance of specific EU objectives, and 
towards regulation of the functioning of national markets as such.326  This, in turn, suggests a further 
departure from the logic of subsidiarity, alongside a declining tolerance for domestic divergence or 
disparities.  Central to both Regulations is implicit acknowledgement that the concept of effective 
competition within the internal market is more complex than the language of ‘free,’ ‘open’ or ‘undistorted’ 
competition suggests.327 
 
VIII. DILEMMAS OF PRICE REGULATION UNDER EU LAW 
 
The starting premise of this article has been that the treatment of price regulation under EU law is recognised 
as atypical, for reasons as-yet under-explored in existing jurisprudence and literature.  In our efforts to tease 
out why this might be the case, we have seen that it is also complex and multi-faceted, with a wide-range of 
approaches—punitive, prohibitive, permissive, and proscriptive—discernible within the legal and regulatory 
framework.  The preceding sections have nonetheless sought to demonstrate that, whether manifested in 
uncharacteristic restraint in antitrust enforcement, a distinctive hostility under the free movement rules, or 
sporadic and explicitly extraordinary instances of top-down regulation, the treatment of restrictions on 
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pricing freedom under EU law diverges from what might be considered the ‘conventional’ approach to 
equivalent legal and economic issues.  In this penultimate section we consider why price regulation is so 
problematic in the context of the internal market, and explore the circumstances in which EU law 
nonetheless endorses such controls as compatible with the goal of open and undistorted competition. 
The treatment of price regulation within EU law accommodates many contrasting regulatory impetuses, 
which extend beyond the bare pursuit of undistorted competition as such.  Within competition policy, there 
is friction between the default preference for unencumbered price-setting versus the pragmatic reality of 
sometimes-dysfunctional markets.  In the realm of integration, there are questions of whether and when price 
controls create distortions that ripple across the internal market, alongside tensions arising from delegation of 
price supervision to domestic regulators.  Justifications for regulation take us into the delicate territory of 
social policy, raising questions of how and to what extent non-economic considerations can be addressed 
within the overtly competitive structure of the internal market; and whether the EU can and should challenge 
domestic regulatory preferences.  As the examples above illustrate, there is no single or simple answer in 
most instances. 
In practice, price regulation remains an inherently domestic activity, meaning that EU law plays an 
essentially secondary role in constraining or directing interventions.  Challenging questions of subsidiarity—
when should EU law intervene?—and proportionality—to what extent should EU law pre-empt domestic 
regulatory choices?—accordingly abound.  Two potential sources of concern with respect to domestic 
regulation implicitly pervade EU law.  First, there is the issue of competence: whether domestic regulators 
have sufficient ability to design and implement effective controls to minimise distortions within the otherwise 
open and competitive internal market.  Second, there are issues of integrity and fidelity to the Union: whether 
domestic regulators can be trusted to work alongside and in furtherance of integration and competition, or 
whether they might fall prey to capture by vested national interests, whether public or private.   
At its core, nonetheless, the distinctive treatment of price regulation under EU law may be explained by 
reference to the central, indeed axiomatic, role of the price formation mechanism in the context of the self-
sustaining internal market.  As we have seen, express acknowledgement of the foundational relationship 
between the free formation of prices and the concept of ‘open and undistorted competition’ is found 
throughout the jurisprudence.  From an antitrust perspective, any effort by private parties “to influence free 
formation of prices” is considered to “manifestly [have] as its object to restrict competition”.328  Under the free 
movement rules, the Court again forcefully defends the importance of “the free formation of prices”329 from 
Member State interference, emphasising that “price competition lays the basis for [traders’] potential to access the market 
directly and to continue to be competitive in it.”330  Even where domestic regulation is anticipated by EU-level 
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330 See fn.159 above. 
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harmonisation, the Court nonetheless takes the view that “a measure which requires a product or service to be offered 
on the market at a determined price…is by its very nature contrary to the objective of achieving an open and competitive 
market.”331  Moreover, the “exceptional” and “unique” nature of top-down price regulation by the EU itself is 
overtly acknowledged.332 
Yet the conceptual and practical challenges extend beyond mere recognition that the notion of 
undistorted competition implies an absence of public control over price formation.  Specifically, price-setting 
lies at the heart of the well-functioning internal market, insofar as it operates as both the facilitator of and the 
reward for exactly the sort of economic behaviour upon which the very existence of the internal market is 
premised.  Price controls thus have a direct negative impact on the interior motivations of would-be 
economic operators, without which the internal market cannot exist in a meaningful sense.  Price regulation 
accordingly differs from other market restrictions, be they limitations on who can provide a product,333 the 
form in which is delivered334 or circumstances surrounding promotion335 or sale.336  The latter may render 
market participation less attractive, but do not challenge the fundamental impetuses of entrepreneurship.  
Arguably, only outright prohibitions on particular product or service categories are more restrictive of 
economic freedom than price regulation; the outcome ultimately pursued, incidentally, in the context of the 
Roaming Regulation.337 
Although the definition of “economic activity” in EU law is sufficiently broad to encompass non-profit 
entities,338 the practical reality is that the vast majority of undertakings operate primarily if not solely to make 
profits.  In the short term, a firm’s ability to decide upon and charge a commercially acceptable price, taking 
account of both the level of competition it faces and its desire to realise a reasonable profit margin, is likely 
to be determinative of both its capacity and its incentive to enter or to continue to compete within a 
marketplace.  Insofar as price regulation deprives individual firms of freedom to engage in self-maximising 
price-setting behaviour, it may dissuade or even entirely prevent such participation.  This harms the 
frustrated trader, denied the opportunity to realise its individual economic freedom through involvement in 
the internal market, and also the competitive process and consumers more generally, who suffer the ill-effects 
of a less buoyant marketplace. 
In the longer term, the presence of price regulation reduces the prospects for market participants to 
earn future supra-competitive profits, pursuit of which is considered to play a vital role in motivating 
competition between individual firms.  This concern was well-articulated by Scalia J in the US Supreme Court 
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decision in Verizon v Trinko, who argued that, “[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short 
period—is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk-taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth.”339 The existence of price regulation, or a possibility of its future enactment, inevitably reduces the 
likelihood that an effective economic operator, who succeeds in increasing its market share through 
competition on the merits—a “pristine monopolist,”340 in US parlance—, will be able subsequently to reap its 
otherwise legitimate reward of higher prices.  Knowledge, ex ante, of its diminished prospects for greater 
returns ex post may, in theory, dissuade the rational firm from seeking a monopoly from the outset.  This 
means, in practice, that it may compete less vigourously, refraining from the sorts of risky or resource-
intensive activities that tend to underpin both short-term and longer-term efficiency gains.   
Accordingly, price controls not only restrict the immediate vitality and potentially the viability of 
competition within regulated segments; more generally, their recurrent use and tolerance could inhibit the 
essential competitive forces, between but also within Member States, that development of the internal market 
seeks to foster and protect.  This fundamental concern, we argue, underlies each of the approaches to price 
regulation discussed above.  In the antitrust context, EU law prioritises market opening and access concerns.  
Conversely, there is a clear reluctance to ‘pick winners,’ seen both in the Commission’s hesitancy when 
presented with allegedly unfair pricing practices, as well as its strong aversion towards (involuntary, at least) 
pricing controls as antitrust remedies.  Advocate General Wahl’s assessment in AKKA provides the clearest 
explanation for the Commission’s unusual restraint: the elevated risks of false positives and 
counterproductive impacts in the longer-term mean that this is an area of antitrust where, in effect, the game 
may not be worth the candle.341 
Under the free movement rules, we argued, the default approach is one of scepticism and hostility.  
Domestic price controls are condemned even where the link to interstate trade is tenuous to the point of 
non-existence; instead the objection appears to be much deeper, concerning a fundamental disconnect 
between regulated prices and so-called ‘conditions of normal and effective competition’.342  Although EU law does not 
outlaw, a priori, domestic restrictions on private price formation, departures from the norm of open and 
undistorted competition are unusually closely scrutinised and narrowly circumscribed, as discussed in sections 
V and VI. 
More specifically, this understanding of the distinctiveness of price regulation may help to reconcile the 
apparently conflicting outcomes in Keck and Scotch Whisky.343  The logic of Keck, in the abstract, is 
unimpeachable: insofar as domestic rules merely regulate intrastate trade, they should fall outside the purview 
of free movement. Yet, arguably, the real mischief that concerned the Keck court was not the domestic price 
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control at issue, but rather the approach within—and criticism of—earlier Sunday trading cases.344  Thus, the 
Keck court provides the right answer, but arguably to the wrong question.  Scotch Whisky leaves intact the basic 
reasoning of the judgment, but clarifies that significant restrictions on pricing freedom fall outside the safety 
of the ‘selling arrangements’ conceit. Indeed, the restraint at issue in Keck—a blanket rule against below-cost 
pricing—presents serious problems from a competition policy perspective, insofar as lower prices are 
precisely what competition is intended to deliver.  Post-Scotch Whisky, a national rule that limits trading hours 
one day per week might still avoid classification as a genuine hindrance to market access;345 but a rule that 
neuters the profit-seeking impulses of potential new entrants cannot similarly escape criticism. 
Finally, to conceive of price regulation as not merely at odds with, but indeed substantively inimicable 
to, development of the internal market—in particular, the underlying interplay of forces of supply and 
demand premised upon the free-functioning of the price formation mechanism—serves to demonstrate just 
what is so extraordinary about the examples of EU-level regulation discussed in section VII.  Although we 
sought to identify plausible and consistent reasons as to why, exceptionally, top-down price controls were 
considered suitable and necessary, the most compelling takeaway may be the extent to which both 
Regulations are so far from the norm of approaches to market supervision within EU law.   
Deferring to the so-called ‘invisible hand’ as the principal means of market regulation, facilitated by the 
free-functioning of the price formation mechanism, brings the additional advantage of avoiding the need for 
top-down regulation to supplant private decision-making.  This, consequently, minimises two distinct sources 
of regulatory tension within the internal market.  Where the task of price regulation lies with the EU itself, 
whether setting individual prices under competition law or mandating harmonised prices under Article 114 
TFEU, we saw that concerns exist both with regards to the EU’s ability to identify and impose optimal 
prices, and the legitimacy, broadly construed, of decisions to do so.  Conversely, divergent controls enacted 
by Member States raise concerns both regarding the absolute quality of regulation and a potential 
fragmentary impact on market integration.  Given that internal market regulation is a shared competence, 
decisions to deviate from the default of private price formation almost unavoidably raise difficult questions 
about which competent regulator should have priority to determine alternative market outcomes.  
Accordingly, a robust defence of the importance of price freedom within EU law brings the oblique benefit 
of forestalling this dilemma. 
Of couse, although competitive markets tend to benefit consumer welfare, efficiency is far from the 
only socially-important value recognised within EU law.  As illustrated by the preceding discussion, it is well-
established that limitations on pricing freedom may be justified in the broader public interest within the social 
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market economy.346  We argue, however, drawing upon the extended understanding of the principle of 
proportionality as articulated in Fedesa,347 that the approach to price regulation within EU law exhibits 
considerable scepticism about whether regulating prices can ever constitute the so-called “least onerous” or least 
restrictive alternative measure available to achieve even legitimate public policy objectives.  This is seen, in 
the realm of antitrust, in the strong default preference for interventions that reinforce existing market forces, 
on the assumption that well-functioning markets can self-correct and eliminate exploitative harms in the 
longer-term.  Scotch Whisky and Deutsche Parkinson illustrate the recent willingness of the Court of Justice to 
second-guess the substance of politically-sensitive domestic policy decisions, and in particular, to conclude 
that Member States ought to opt instead for specified alternatives to price regulation.  As a ‘lesser evil’ 
approach, the permissive attitude discernible within the sector-specific directives necessarily accepts the 
appropriateness of domestic price controls in certain contexts.  Yet comparatively tight EU-level supervision 
of the manner and circumstances in which pricing restraints can be implemented, alongside muscular 
enforcement against domestic regulation considered to exceed the limited discretion granted to Member 
States, suggest a more suspicious, indeed hostile approach in practice.  Finally, what is exceptional about the 
top-down instances of EU-level price regulation considered above is precisely that, in the market 
circumstances at issue, the EU institutions were prepared to accept that no less onerous alternative solutions 
existed to remedy the identified dysfunctions.  When the validity of the Roaming Regulation came before the 
Court of Justice in Vodafone, moreover, the Court expressly rejected a ‘best possible option’ standard of 
review in favour of the more deferential ‘manifest inappropriateness’ standard, justifying its approach on the 
basis that the EU legislature (but not, it would seem, Member States) “must be allowed a broad discretion in areas in 
which its action involves political, economic and social choices”.348  Thus, price regulation is frequently an available policy 
option, but is rarely viewed as optimal—unless, of course, the EU institutions decide the contrary.  
Another important, and largely overlooked, aspect of the treatment of price regulation is its relationship 
to the internal market qua single market.  As argued, domestic rules that limit private price-setting are 
formally anathema to the philosophical bent of development of the internal market.  Yet this desire to 
preserve the free functioning of the price formation mechanism, and specifically, to stamp out divergences in 
domestic practices regarding price regulation, belies the inherent difficulties of harmonising prices.  It is 
considerably more straightforward for EU law to prompt alignment of, for instance, domestic rules 
governing sales practices or qualification of providers than it is to require the elimination of price differences 
between Member States.  As Advocate General Wahl noted in AKKA, “elements such as—to name but a few—
domestic taxes, the particular characteristics of the national labour market and local consumers’ preferences may significantly 
affect the final prices of the relevant product or service.”349  Moreover, as the Court itself acknowledged, “there are, as a 
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general rule, significant differences in price levels between Member States for identical services, those differences being closely linked 
with the differences in citizens’ purchasing power”.350  Considering the validity of the Airport Charges Directive, 
Advocate General Mengozzi similarly argued that different national circumstances mean that quite different 
fee levels may remain appropriate across the EU, even applying common principles for price-setting.351  In 
this regard, again, the Roaming Regulation was quite extraordinary, implying as it did that a single appropriate 
price (nominally, price cap) could be identified for and applied across the 28 Member States.  (The 
Interchange Fee Regulation sidesteps this problem by adopting a percentage-of-transaction-value approach.)  
Persistent, often significant, differences in price across the internal market—‘organic’ in the sense that they 
arise as a result of variances in supply and demand, rather than public or private manipulation of the price 
formation mechanism—arguably call into question the contention that price regulation functions as an 
appreciable barrier to market interpentration.  Even absent domestic controls, de facto variations in the 
effective price across the internal market may have similar negative effects on incentives for participation and 
competitive behaviour.  Forcing complete alignment of prices is (largely) beyond the remit and indeed the 
concern of EU law.  Yet what the numerous cases addressing price regulation demonstrate is that differences 
attributable to ‘artificial’ intervention—such as price controls—are inherently suspect in a way that organic 
differences simply cannot be.   
Finally, it is instructive to note the variety of procedural postures identifiable across the jurisprudence 
addressing price regulation.  These cases should not be read, solely or even primarily, as an EU-level 
institutional attack on domestic controls.  In fact, many of the most prominent decisions, from Keck to Scotch 
Whisky, initially involved somewhat opportunistic attempts by traders to invoke EU law to attack 
inconvenient national rules; efforts that receive varying degrees of assistance from the Court of Justice.  
Others involve Member State attempts to challenge EU-level efforts to control352 or mandate price 
regulation,353 typically premised on subsidiarity concerns.  Of course, the Commission retains jurisdiction to 
pursue Member States whose pricing controls might infringe EU law and thus amount to a failure to fulfil 
EU-level obligations.354  As cases such as Deutsche Telekom illustrate, however, what is ostensibly the most 
proper legal approach may not be the most strategically effective one.  Most interesting going forward 
perhaps is the increasing decentralisation of the antitrust rules, involving both NCAs and private plaintiffs in 
enforcement at national level.  Experience with the former suggests that domestic enforcers are more ready 
to pursue alleged exploitative harms than their EU-level counterpart; it is hardly to be expected that private 
litigants will exercise greater restraint.  What is remarkable about this wide-ranging catalogue is the diversity 
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of perspectives it reveals: not only the winners and losers of the wealth redistribution that price controls 
frequently represent, but also broader constitutional and even restitutionary concerns.  The dilemma of 
regulating prices within the EU thus raises legal issues that are exceptional yet transcend easy categorisation; 




That ‘money makes the world go round’ is a contemporary cliché, and the operation of the internal market is 
no exception.  The free-functioning of the price formation mechanism is, at least in theory, pivotal to its 
effective operation: both to secure an efficient distribution in the short-term, and to incentivise greater 
economic activity within the internal market in the longer-term.  Moreover, market regulation by means of 
the ‘invisible hand’ bypasses the often-controversial question of which polity, the EU or its Member States, 
should have jurisdiction to ‘pick winners’ and determine the optimal market outcome going forward.  Yet the 
treatment of price regulation under EU law points to certain paradoxes that lie within the concept of a ‘highly 
competitive social market economy’.  Pricing and the price formation mechanism are central components of 
any system of open competition; yet free formation of prices cannot alone guarantee effective competition, 
nor it is indispensable to well-functioning markets in the broader sense.  The social policy concerns and 
market conditions that underpin most regulation are typically national in origin and nature; yet the existence 
of multiple discrete and discordant price control structures is inapposite in moving towards an ostensible 
single market.  Price regulation and its discontents within EU law thus reflects the inherent tensions and 
compromises that arise from an inevitable sharing of regulatory jurisdiction within the internal market, 
alongside the complications that stem from a plurality of legitimate yet conflicting regulatory goals.   
This article has sought to unpick the treatment of price regulation, identifying and exploring discrete 
strands within EU case-law and regulatory practice: considering punitive, prohibitive, permissive and even 
prescriptive perspectives.  The various approaches adopted provide insight into the complexity of both the 
underlying regulatory phenomenon and the wider task of developing the internal market within a multilevel 
institutional structure.  The article has further advanced a tentative explanation for the acknowledged 
distinctive status of price regulation within EU law.  Crucially, such controls restrict not only how or how 
vigorously undertakings can compete within the internal market, but may also impact more fundamentally 
upon the interior motivations and entrepreneurial impluses which determine whether economic actors are 
prepared to participate at all in the market process.  The approach of the Court of Justice in Metro (II) thus 
comes more readily into focus:355 price competition is not an absolute value, yet EU law is deeply reluctant to 
sanction any wholesale departure from its axiomatic market model.  ‘Open and undistorted competition’ is 
thus both slogan and archetype, though not, ultimately, an unbending prescription within EU law.   
                                                     
355 See fn.36 above. 
